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NOT IN GOOD FAITH
Elizabeth A. Nowicki*
Abstract
Corporate directors are obligated to act "in good faith," and directors
face personal monetary liability to their shareholders for acts "not in good
faith." Yet no modern court has imposed liability accordingly. Every time
the issue of a director's good faith comes up in court, the court forces the
complaining shareholder to prove that her directors acted affirmatively in
bad faith as opposed to merely in the absence of good faith. The judiciary
completely misses the point that acts lacking good faith are not always the
same as acts affirmatively taken in bad faith. A director can act in the
absence of good faith without going so far as to act affirmatively act in bad
faith. More troubling, the academics who write in the area of corporate
law also completely miss the distinction between acts showing a lack of
good faith-acts "not in good faith"--and acts in bad faith.
This wordsmith failure changes the entire nature of a director's duty to
her shareholders, and it renders impotent a director's obligation to act in
good faith. This becomes most evident when reviewing allegations of di-
rector inattention. For example, if a director votes on her CEO's compen-
sation package without actually reading the compensation agreement
because it is not finalized in time for the board meeting, that director is not
acting in good faith. Yet she is also not affirmatively acting in bad faith-
she is not deliberately trying to hurt the corporation. Her vote is simply an
inattentive act-an act not in good faith. Given the judiciary's use of a
bad-faith standard when reviewing whether a director acted in good faith,
the inattentive or half-hearted director will never face liability.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee Law School. Many thanks
to Professors Lyman Johnson, Stephen Bainbridge, Larry Hammermesh, Larry Mitchell,
Mel Eisenberg, Larry Ribstein, Usha Rodrigues, Gordon Smith, Kate Litvak, Renee Jones,
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faith." Thank you also to Professors Jeff Rachlinski, George Hay, Brad Wendel, and the
rest of the faculty at Cornell Law School for their feedback on the initial presentation of
this paper. Outstanding research assistance was provided by Jennifer Jennings, Justin Cur-
tis and Kristin Watts, and the SMU Law Review staff did a stellar editing job on the final
draft of this article.
On a personal note, I much regret that my friend and mentor, Columbia Law School
great E. Allan Farnsworth, did not live to learn of this "not in good faith" paper. It would
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This paper exposes in detail the problems that stem from this careless
linguistic substitution, and this paper argues for a sea change among the
judiciary and members of the academy who insist on bastardizing a direc-
tor's obligation to act in good faith. The erosion of a director's obligation
to act in good faith does not bode well for the modern corporation and the
economy, and a meaningful interpretation of "not in good faith" is neces-
sary to help halt that erosion.
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INTRODUCTION
HE phrase "not in good faith" might seem odd as a title of a law
review article. Further, an article primarily about the difference in
meaning between the phrase "not in good faith" and the phrase
"bad faith" might seem exceedingly trite. In any realm other than corpo-
rate law and governance, these assessments might be accurate. In the
realm of corporate law, however, the phrase "not in good faith" is incred-
ibly powerful. Every investor in the stock market should pay close atten-
tion to the phrase "not in good faith," since it is the key to preventing
another decade of lethargic corporate governance. However, little notice
has been paid to this phrase.
Allow me to create a context for this discussion: Directors manage cor-
porations that are owned by shareholders, and directors therefore have a
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fiduciary relationship with the corporation and its shareholders.1 How-
ever, despite the demanding standards of conduct usually imposed on fi-
duciary relationships,2 directors have historically been treated with a
deference that belies the critical nature of their position of trust and con-
fidence. 3 Despite the host of issues that arise from managing other peo-
ple's money, the actions of directors vis-A-vis their corporation are almost
always viewed as beyond judicial scrutiny. Essentially, an outside direc-
tor is only obligated to act "in good faith;" an outside director is only
liable to shareholders for acts "not in good faith."'4
Courts and academics, however, have substituted the phrase "bad
faith" for the phrase "not in good faith" when reviewing a director's al-
leged failure to act in good faith. This linguistic manipulation might not
appear to mean much; indeed, common parlance readily substitutes the
phrase "bad faith" for the phrase "not in good faith." In the context of
director liability, however, replacing the phrase "not in good faith" with
"bad faith" robs shareholders of the only basis on which they can credibly
have any hope of holding their directors accountable.
The import of this substitution is best considered against the corporate
landscape over the past decade or so, littered with corporate governance
failures, scandals, capital-raising and disclosure chicanery, incestuous bus-
iness dealings, and general stockholder disregard. The behemoth Enron
went completely bankrupt, due in large part to corporate dishonesty and
hubris,5 and WorldCom investors suffered a similar fate as mismanage-
ment and financial tomfoolery came to light.6 The investors in Tyco,
Adelphia, and numerous other corporations fell victim to the same ilk of
wrongs, ranging from simple financial mismanagement, lapses in ethics,7
executive gluttony,8 and corporate governance abdication, 9 to dishonest
1. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 203
(8th ed. 2000).
2. Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 767, 774 (2000).
3. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (dis-
cussing the deference usually given to corporate directors and officers).
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.02 (Bart Schwartz & Amy L.
Goodman eds., 2005).
5. Thomas S. Mulligan, The Enron Verdicts, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al.
6. Shawn Young, Henry Sender & Deborah Soloman, Lending the News: Worldcom
Gets Judge's Approval for $570 Million in Financing, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2002, at A3.
7. Owen Moritz, Bada Boeing! CEO Out 37M, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 11, 2005,
at 18 (discussing how former Boeing CEO, Harry Stonecipher, violated the company code
of ethics when he had an affair with a company vice-president).
8. Mark Maremont, Frequent Fliers: Amid Crackdown, the Jet Perk Suddenly Looks a
Lot Pricier, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2005, at Al (discussing personal use by corporate execu-
tives of corporation-owned jets for personal use; values of the personal use often well
above $500,000).
9. The Washington Post quoted Carl Icahn's discouraging observations about board
behavior: "Literally, half the board is dozing off. The other half is reading the Wall Street
Journal. And then they put slides up a lot and nobody can understand the slides and when




disclosure and other outright crimes. 10 The late 1990s brought a series of
corporate "scandals" that were devastating to many stockholders.
Thousands of investors lost the stock they were counting on for retire-
ment.1 While much of this financial bloodshed likely could have been
avoided had the directors of the corporations at issue been paying closer
attention, not a single director was pilloried for these corporate failures.
A non-corporate-law scholar might wonder why corporate directors
who so clearly fell asleep at their corporate helms walked away from the
corporate carnage virtually unscathed-why Enron CEO Kenneth Lay
was convicted of a felony while his directors, who failed to detect his fla-
grantly illegal conduct, appear to have kept their good names.12 How-
ever, to a student of corporate law, the reason for this outcome is clear:
The only tool shareholders have to render an outside director accounta-
ble is the director's obligation to act in good faith, and courts have
twisted this meaningful fiduciary obligation into the mere obligation to
refrain from acting in bad faith. To the extent that personal liability was
ever a motivator to keep directors on guard, it has ceased to be so. 13
A director's affirmative obligation to do right by his shareholders has
been diluted over the past few decades into the impotent obligation to
refrain from deliberately harming his corporation. This leaves sharehold-
ers with precious little leverage. In practice, given the difficulty of prov-
ing affirmative bad faith, an outside director's obligation to act in good
faith has been rendered all but meaningless. Refraining from affirma-
tively acting in bad faith requires very little of a director. The director is
free to prioritize other interests above those of the corporation, fail to
exercise thorough oversight, and generally be inattentive, leashed only by
his obligation to refrain from affirmatively trying to harm or act against
the interests of his corporate charge. So when a shareholder complains
that her director failed to follow-up on a costly technology lapse, 14 failed
10. Constance L. Hays, As Stewart Attends Hearing, Company Studies Options, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at C2 (discussing the board of directors of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia grappling with Martha Stewart's position with the company after she was con-
vinced of criminal obstruction of justice).
11. See David Barboza, From Enron's Rubble, Life on a Luxury Tightrope, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2002, § 3, at 1 (stating that thousands of former Enron employees lost
millions of dollars in retirement benefits); see also Ronald Brownstein, Enron Fallout
Proves Personal Loss Can Have Big Political Consequences, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2002, at
A10 (discussing how widespread increases in the diversity of stock ownership over the past
twenty-five years have led to wide-spread interest in the Enron scandal and resultant En-
ron stock decimation).
12. Mulligan, supra note 5, at Al.
13. Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent Director of
Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 315, 329 (2005) ("[F]iduciary duties and per-
sonal liability rules fail to create a sufficient incentive to act in the best interest of the
corporation.").
14. Paul Davies & Joann S. Lublin, Director's Choice, As Crises Pile Up, Bristol CEO
Relies on Board Allies, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2005, at Al (discussing how, despite Bristol-
Myers Squibb's CEO Peter Dolan's bungling of a new product potential release (Erbitux)
and related "channel-stuffing" to account for lost revenues, the Bristol-Myers board al-
lowed Dolan to keep his job); accord Barbara Martinez & Ilan Brat, Vioxx Posed Heart
Risk After Just a Few Weeks, Data Suggest, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at A17 (discussing
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to read financial statements littered with misstatements,' 5 ignored share-
holder concerns,16 or skipped the annual meeting,' 7 courts will do noth-
ing unless the complaining shareholder can establish the notoriously
elusive element of bad faith.
For those who believe that legal liability is one of the precious few ways
to motivate directors to do their jobs well,18 this "good faith"/"bad faith"
substitution is devastating. Obligating a director to merely refrain from
acting in bad faith is a paltry legal obligation. When forced to prioritize
obligations, professional or personal, a director who is only accountable
for bad faith acts is more likely to short-change her corporation over an-
other, more empowered, demanding constituency, such as a spouse. This
is not to say that directors are ill-intentioned or sluggards-they are not.
They are, however, busy professionals who often do not have enough
time in the day to pay careful attention to all of their personal and busi-
ness responsibilities.1 9 It would be nafve to think that directors, when
forced to choose how they prioritize their time and resources, always put
their corporate charges at the top of their list, given the lack of penalties
for not fully prioritizing the corporation.
It is for this reason that all investors in the public markets should care
how the phrase "not in good faith" is defined. To the extent that the
phrase "not in good faith" is the only stick available in a world where
carrots are freely offered, the phrase deserves close consideration. Suc-
cessful lawsuits against directors who failed to fulfill their obligation to
act in good faith should go far to inspire corporate governance self-re-
form. For this reason, the measly phrase "not in good faith" merits its
own article.
In this Article, I reexamine what it means for a director to act in good
faith and what it means for a director to fail to act in good faith. I ex-
amine what courts and contemporary corporate-law scholars have indi-
research which shows that even early clinical trials of Vioxx offered results indicating that
the risk of increased heart problems among Vioxx users was statistically significant; no
indication that Merck's board of directors ever pushed for more data regarding Vioxx
trials.)
15. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 417-20 (2004) (discussing Enron's misleading financial
statements).
16. Merissa Marr, One Year Later, Disney Attempts Smoother Ride, WALL ST. J., Feb.
7, 2005, at B1 (discussing the lack of board action regarding the 45% of investor shares
which voted to withhold support for Disney CEO Eisner being re-elected to the board).
17. Chad Terhune, Home Depot's Critics Tear into Firm's Practices, Conduct, WALL
ST. J., May 27, 2006, at B3.
18. See James Andreoni, William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, The Carrot or the
Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 AM. ECON. R. 893, 894 (2003) (discuss-
ing the value of punishment as compared to reward); accord Linda D. Molm, Is Punish-
ment Effective? Coercive Strategies in Social Exchange, Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. Jun. 1994, at 75
(testing competing predictions about the effectiveness of coercive strategies in social
exchange).
19. See Abigail Aims, 2005 Trends in Corporate Governance Practices of the 100 Larg-
est U.S. Public Companies, 1523 PRAC. L. INST.-CORP. 223, 247 (2006) (reporting on mul-
tiple-board membership among directors at 100 large U.S. companies).
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cated regarding a director's obligation to act in good faith, and how these
groups have resorted to defining "not in good faith" as "bad faith." Ulti-
mately, in this Article, I debunk the myth that it is acceptable for a court
examining the question of whether a director acted in the absence of
good faith to instead examine whether the director acted in bad faith, and
I propose a simple structure within which to assess whether a director
failed to honor his obligation to act in good faith.
Part I of this Article, I describe generally a director's fiduciary duty of
care as a foundation for the discussions in the rest of the Article. I ex-
plain the duty of care standard of conduct, and I examine the standard of
review that is applied by courts when faced with an alleged breach of a
director's duty of care. In a summarized fashion, I explore the workings
of the ephemeral business judgment rule, which is best described as a
protective presumption that is automatically afforded to a director whose
conduct is under judicial review based on an alleged breach of the duty of
care. The business judgment rule presumption works to protect directors
from being second-guessed by complaining shareholders and governs
when the presumption's protections will be stripped from a director.
Next, Part I briefly explores legislative limitations on a director's liability
exposure, ending with a summary of the critical role of the phrase "good
faith" in the duty of care and director liability calculus.
Part II of this Article contains a brief definitional analysis of the
phrases "good faith," "not in good faith," and "bad faith." This Part ex-
amines the literal meanings of these phrases and uses the examination to
compare, and ultimately contrast, the definitions of bad faith and not in
good faith as they apply to director conduct. Showing how the phrases
differ in meaning (though they sometimes overlap in application), Part II
discusses the troubling trend of defining a director's fiduciary obligation
to act in good faith as simply the obligation to refrain from acting in bad
faith. I make the argument that, as a matter of linguistics, the phrases
"bad faith" and "not in good faith" simply cannot be interchanged in the
corporate law context. It is one thing to require those entrusted with
investors' money to act "in good faith," and it is quite another to require
those fiduciaries to merely refrain from acting "in bad faith."
Part III of this Article discusses two additional ramifications of the bad
faith substitution: Requiring a complaining shareholder qua plaintiff to
prove that a director acted in true bad faith, as opposed to having to
prove that a director exhibited a lack of good faith, imposes a burden on
the plaintiff beyond that which she should rightfully carry. Bastardizing
the phrases "good faith" and "not in good faith" erodes one of the pillars
of corporate governance-the obligation of corporate agents to act in the
best interests of the corporation.
Part IV of the Article revisits a few topics that appear and reappear in
the broader director liability dialogue. Debate regarding the "not in
good faith" interpretation and application I advocate in this Article is
likely to lead naysayers to raise concerns regarding Delaware's infamous
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case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, directors and officers insurance, and the
potential for the director pool to dry up in response to liability exposure
focus. In this part, I show that (a) Smith v. Van Gorkom did not, contrary
to popular belief, expand the personal liability of directors for fiduciary
duty breaches, (b) the fear that imposing personal liability on directors
for acts "not in good faith" will lead to a directors' and officers' insurance
crisis is unfounded, and (c) holding directors accountable for acts "not in
good faith" will not significantly impact the market for qualified corpo-
rate directors. In a related vein, Part V of the Article discusses a few
practical points pertaining to mitigating director liability for fiduciary
duty breaches, such as professional directors and corporate governance
best practices.
I. A DIRECTOR'S FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The corporate form is defined by the separation of ownership from
control.20 Shareholders "own" the corporation, but the board of direc-
tors "controls" the corporation: directors are statutorily charged with
managing the business and affairs of the corporation.21 This separation is
beneficial to the passive investor, but it raises an interesting issue: How
20. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-89 (1948).
21. Id.; see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (discussing the
separation of ownership and control); see also Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (providing the statutory separation of ownership and
control). Most boards of directors of large contemporary corporations delegate their au-
thority for managing the daily minutia of the corporation to executive officers, pursuant to
the authority to delegate given to directors in section 141(a) (or the equivalent in the statu-
tory code for the state in which the corporation is incorporated). (Delaware will be used as
the primary state of reference for purposes of statutory analysis or close examination of
case law, given that Delaware is home to 60% of the Fortune 500 and 50% of all publicly
traded companies in the United States. See Delaware Division of Corporations, http://
www.corp.delaware.gov/.)
Much has been written about the ramifications of Delaware's pro-management statutory
and judicial efforts to encourage corporations to incorporate in Delaware and whether
Delaware's efforts and the responsive efforts of other states have led to a "race to the
bottom" in terms of corporate management deference and protection. E.g., ARTHUR R.
PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 1.08, at 14 (1st ed.
1999) (citing William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974)); accord Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-58 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see generally DEL. STATE DEPT., CORP. Div., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT (2005),
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/2005%20doc%20ar.pdf (including statistics and discussing
Delaware's efforts to increase the number of corporations incorporated in Delaware).
The "race to the bottom" discussion is both fascinating and beyond the scope of this
Article. That said, I am increasingly sympathetic to Professor Lawrence Mitchell's
position:
The laxity of Delaware law, or its significance, has long been a subject of
dispute. With such shameful and disingenuous opinions as In re Caremark
Int'l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) and Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327
(Del. Ch. 1997), I believe the matter can no longer be in dispute.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Govern-
ance, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 n.2 (2003). Professor Mitchell reflects what was so poeti-
cally penned by other corporate-law scholars about Delaware almost a decade prior:
Predicting the course of Delaware law from prior case law is like watching
clouds. They seem, at times, to take on recognizable shapes and forms, even
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should directors manage assets owned by a different constituency, the
shareholders? 22 Because corporations do not have the unity of owner-
ship and control exhibited in a sole proprietorship, where the owner her-
self directly manages her business, some minimum behavioral standards
for directors are needed to ensure that corporate directors devote the
same attention and effort to the corporation as they would devote to a
business owned by them personally.23 For this reason, directors have
been charged with fiduciary duties: Directors are fiduciaries both of their
shareholders and the corporation.24
Directors have two distinct fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty and the
to resemble something familiar. But you know that whatever shapes you
think you see can vanish in a puff of wind.
Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After
QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW.
1593, 1626 (1994).
22. A useful discussion of the issues underpinning this question is discussed in STEVEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 194-95 (2002).
23. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (2004) (discussing the two competing views among academics
as to which constituency's interests-directors' or shareholders'-shall prevail). Whether
directors actually prioritize shareholder interests as opposed to the directors' own interests
has been the fodder for much debate. Some academics embrace the "shareholder primacy
model" of corporate governance, and other scholars instead focus on the "director primacy
model" of corporate governance. For purposes of this discussion, we step away from this
theoretical distinction, because neither perspective alters the fact that directors are in-
arguably fiduciaries for something else (the corporation) or someone else (the sharehold-
ers). Directors generally own stock in the corporation, such that they are shareholders, but
they are also paid a salary and often awarded already in-the-money stock options such that
they do not "need" an increase in the net present value or the market value of the corpora-
tion to the same degree that a mere shareholder, not drawing a salary from the corpora-
tion, will value.
24. There is not absolute agreement on what specific fiduciary label is appropriate for
directors-whether agent, trustee, or something else. Corporate officers and directors have
traditionally been viewed as agents. FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY 33-34 (1889) ("[O]nly through the employment of agents [can] the executive
functions of the corporation be exercised."); FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW ON PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 104, 187-88 (2d ed. 1924) ("a corporation ... can act only
through the intervention of agents") ("The corporate executive ... is an agent for the
shareholder."); see also VICTOR MORAWETZ, II THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 575, 547 (2d ed. 1886) ("There are few acts which a corporation aggregate can possibly
perform without the intervention of an agency of some kind," such that "[c]orporations
almost invariably act through agents.").
Yet, some scholars argue that officers and directors cannot be agents because the rela-
tionship between the director and the shareholder (the "agent" and the "principal," as it
were) is not a product of contract, as it would be in the traditional agency relationship.
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCIURE OF A BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
("[D]irectors are not agents of the corporation but are sui generis... neither [are] directors
... agents of the stockholders[.]").
Additionally, case law also indicates that the director-shareholder-corporation relation-
ship involves both a trust relationship and an agency relationship:
[T]he ordinary rules of law relating to an agent are applicable in considering
the acts of a board of directors in behalf of a corporation when dealing with
third persons .... [Whereas] [t]he relation of the directors to the stockhold-
ers is essentially that of trustee and cestui que trust.
People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911). Yet the Restatement Third
of Trusts notes that:
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duty of care.25 To fulfill her duty of loyalty, a director is obligated to act
There are many similarities and also differences in the roles and duties of
trustees and those of corporate officers or directors, partners of various types
of partnerships, and member-managers of limited-liability companies.
For example, trustees and corporate officers and directors, as fiduciaries,
manage the affairs, respectively, of the trust or the corporation for the bene-
fit of the beneficiaries or the shareholders. Corporate officers and directors,
however, do not hold title to the property of the corporation and therefore
are not trustees; accordingly their fiduciary duties are not within the scope of
this Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. g (2003).
Regardless of the debate about which specific fiduciary label to put on directors, it is
undisputed that directors hold some sort of fiduciary relationship with respect to their cor-
poration and its shareholders. See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533,
539 (1996). This fiduciary nature, regardless of its precise categorization, brings with it
fiduciary duties.
25. The two fiduciary duties of directors have historically been the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty. See Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 121-22 (Conn. 1997); see also In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003). Interestingly,
however, over the past several years, the Delaware Supreme Court has, on occasion, re-
ferred to the fiduciary duties as a "triad," including the duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) ("The directors of a
Delaware corporation have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good
faith"). This third duty-the duty of good faith-appears to have become a "duty" (which
I take to mean something beyond merely an obligation, and something for which indepen-
dent recourse exists) essentially overnight. Compare id., and Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 54 (Del. 1989) ("Eight of Fairchild's nine directors are
charged with breach of their fiduciary duties of good faith and due care .. "), with Para-
mount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) ("[T]he directors
must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.") (quoting
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989), and citing Mills Acquisi-
tion Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)), and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (referring to "the triads of [a directors'] fiduciary
duty-good faith, loyalty or due care"). The Delaware Supreme Court has never ex-
plained where they pulled this third duty from, and, indeed, more than one jurist on the
Delaware Chancery Court has questioned the appearance of this new "duty." Guttman v.
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003). In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court
has not been consistent in including this duty of good faith in its recitations of a director's
fiduciary duties. While I certainly agree that directors have the obligation to act in good
faith, the obligation to act in good faith has historically been subsumed both in the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty as opposed to being a stand-alone duty. See Continuing Credi-
tors' Comm. of Star Telecomms. Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 446, 440 n.9 (D. Del.
2004) ("Although the Plaintiff also invokes the duty of good faith as separate from the
duty of loyalty, Delaware case law states that the two duties are identical.") (quoting Nagy
v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
For purposes of this Article, I am ignoring the duty of loyalty. Professor Lyman John-
son, however, makes a convincing argument that the duty of care issues that come up in
cases such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864, and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 825 A.2d at 286, could also be addressed as duty of loyalty issues. Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27 (2003). Are you being loyal, Professor Johnson would ask, and are you being
faithful, when you (the director) pay little attention to the compensation of senior execu-
tives (for example)? In a more user-friendly hypothetical, would we call a friend who we
have authorized to use our money to pay our dogsitter while we are on vacation "loyal" if
that friend gave the dogsitter a $200 tip just because the dogsitter showed up every day
(like she was obligated to do anyway)? No. Our friend was not loyal; she was frittering
away our money needlessly. If we view "loyal" conduct in the director context the way we
view "loyal" conduct in real life-faithful conduct for the benefit of the one to whom we
are loyal-then many "duty of care" fact patterns could just as well be viewed as "duty of
loyalty" cases. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corpo-
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in a way that puts the interests of the corporation ahead of her own inter-
ests.26 A director's fiduciary duty of care obligates her "to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
similar circumstances" when managing corporate affairs. 27 While this
standard of conduct is already lenient, courts employ an even more gen-
erous standard of review when a director is alleged to have failed to meet
the standard of conduct.28 When reviewing an alleged breach of her duty
of care, a director will be afforded the protection of the business judg-
ment rule, which is a presumption in favor of the director, insulating the
director from liability, unless the complaining shareholder can show that
the director was conflicted, did not act in good faith, or was grossly negli-
gent in becoming informed about the matter regarding which it is alleged
she breached her fiduciary duty.29 Only rarely is this business judgment
rule presumption rebutted by a complaining shareholder, such that the
rate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (discussing fiduciary
duties in the context of the role that corporate officers and directors have played in recent
corporate scandals).
26. In a situation where a director is "conflicted," such as when she has a business
relationship with the corporation that she serves beyond simply her director relationship,
she must favor first the interests of the corporation.
27. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); accord I DEN-
NIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
109 (5th ed. 1998) ("[T]he duty of care requires that directors exercise the care that a
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances."). Some states (such
as New York and California) have codified the standard of conduct for directors, while
other states (such as Delaware) have no such statutory provisions. See CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 309(a) (West 2007); NY Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (2007); see generally PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994).
28. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS 544-45 (8th ed. unabridged 2000):
On their face, the duties of directors are fairly demanding, insofar as they are
measured by reasonability. In practice, however, the standards of review ap-
plied to the performance of these duties are less stringent than the standards
of conduct on which the duties are based.
Judge Winter of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals similarly went so far as to admit in
an opinion:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for
negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a
statement is misleading .... [A] corporate officer who makes a mistake in
judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line effi-
ciency will rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the
corporation.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
29. The business judgment rule operates as a protective presumption, based on the
assumption that "the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action [at issue] was in the best interests of the company."
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d
119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971)); see also Norman E. Veasey, Access to Justice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 1, 6 (2003). More specifically, the four factual assumptions identified in Aronson as
justifying the business judgment rule presumption are (1) a decision having been made, (2)
after the directors became reasonably informed about the matter at issue, and (3) the di-
rectors acted in good faith, (4) without any self-interest or conflict. Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812; accord In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(the business judgment presumption is based on the assumption that "the decision made
was the product of a process that was either deliberately considered in good faith or was
otherwise rational"). Id.
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director's actions are subject to closer scrutiny. 30
Even in the rare case where shareholders are able to rebut the business
judgment rule presumption, directors are usually insulated from personal
liability by statutory provisions such as Delaware General Corporate Law
(DGCL) section 102(b)(7), which provides that a corporation can include
in its certificate of incorporation:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision
shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any
The business judgment rule presumption, with its very deferential "irrationality" stan-
dard of review, serves a sound policy goal: it encourages directors to exercise their discre-
tion in making decisions based on then-existing facts without fear of being second-guessed.
EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 547-48; see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment
Rule as an Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) (discussing the two competing
views among academics as to which constituency's interests shall prevail).
A lenient measure of post hoc review protects against hindsight bias. As a
result of a systematic defect in cognition known as the hindsight bias, how-
ever, under a reasonableness standard of review fact-finders might too often
erroneously treat decisions that turned out badly as bad decisions, and un-
fairly hold directors liable for such decisions, and experimental psychology
has shown that in hindsight people consistently exaggerate the case with
which outcomes could have been anticipated in foresight.
EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 25; see Joy v. North, 682 F. 2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[Clourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate
corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later .... "). A court will not, therefore, second-
guess a decision made by a director that, in hindsight, was merely wrong, a mistake, or an
unfortunate choice among multiple options. BLOCK, supra note 27, at 109. Although the
relatively recent Delaware case of Aronson v. Lewis is usually cited to support this defer-
ence, this concept is actually not a modem one. See, e.g., FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 502, 337-38 (1889) ("The law does not presume negligence on
the part of the agent. On the other hand, it presumes that the agent has done his duty,
until the contrary appears, and the burden of proof is upon him who alleges a misfeasance,
to establish it.").
This deference to directors is sensible, because we want directors to make somewhat
"risky" decisions, given that "potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk." Joy,
692 F.2d at 886 (discussing the risk and reward calculus that weighs in favor of directors
sometimes making riskier decisions to achieve greater benefits for the shareholders be-
cause shareholders can diversify away a corporation's risk); see also Dennis J. Block & H.
Adam Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva
Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32 (1981). Shareholders, knowing of this risk-reward calculus,
can either elect not to buy stock, given that the market offers an array of other investment
vehicles, or shareholders can mitigate the risk inherent in any given investment by diversi-
fying their investment portfolio and holding many different stocks in disparate industries.
Joy, 692 F.2d at 885-86. The Second Circuit in Joy went so far as to say "[g]iven mutual
funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not bend over backwards to
give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not
diversifying." Id. at 886. This diversification or voluntary decision to invest in stock with
an understanding of the general volatility of the market frees the directors of each individ-
ual corporation to more broadly make appropriately risky decisions. WILLIAM A. KLEIN &
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 233-35 (8th ed. 2000).
30. See McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1028 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("If the director de-
fendants had disabling conflicts of interest or acted in bad faith . . . they would have to
prove the fairness of the transaction."); EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 545-46 (discussing
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993)).
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breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which in-
volve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)
under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit. 3 1
This provision of the DGCL, which has been broadly used by most of the
300 Delaware-incorporated corporations on the Fortune 500, allows a
business that is incorporated in Delaware to fully insulate its directors
against personal liability for any fiduciary duty breach other than those in
the limited categories of breach of the duty of loyalty and acts or omis-
sions "not in good faith. '32
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007) (emphasis added). Every state in the
union except Ohio, Nevada, and Indiana has a statutory provision limiting a director's
personal liability for duty of care breaches. See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-2.02 (adopted in
1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210 (adopted in 1988); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-202
(adopted in 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202 (adopted in 1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204
(adopted in 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-108-402 (adopted in 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-636 (adopted in 1994); GA. CODE ArN. §14-2-202 (adopted in 1987); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 30-1-202 (adopted in 1997); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-10 (adopted in 1994); IOWA
CODE § 490.831 (adopted in 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002 (adopted in 1987); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020 (adopted in 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24 (adopted
in 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 202 (adopted in 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& Ass'NS §§ 2-104, 2-405.2 and MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-418 (adopted in
1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 13 (adopted in 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1209
(adopted in 1987); MINN. STAT. § 300.64 (adopted in 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-2.02
(adopted in 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.055 (adopted in 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-
213 (adopted in 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2018 (adopted in 1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-A:2.02 (adopted in 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7 (adopted in 1987); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 402 (adopted in 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02 (adopted in 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE §10-19.1-50 (adopted in 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. xviii, § 1006 (adopted in
1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047 (adopted in 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48 (adopted in
1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-202.1 (adopted in 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-
102 (adopted in 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302, § 7.06 (adopted in 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-841 (adopted in 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 2.02
(adopted in 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (adopted in 1988); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.08.320 (adopted in 1989); W. VA. CODE § 31D-2-202 (adopted in 2002); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 17-16-202 (adopted in 1989). A few states offer statutory duty of care protection
that differs slightly from Delaware's protection, but the differing statutes still serve to limit
the personal liability exposure of the directors. For example, Virginia's statutory insulation
offers directors protection via a monetary liability cap. The Virginia code limits the recov-
erable damages that can be garnered from any one director in any proceeding brought by
or in the right of the corporation or its shareholders to the lesser of the monetary cap
specified in the articles of incorporation or shareholder-approved by-laws, or the greater of
$100,000 or the cash compensation receive by the director from the corporation over the
twelve months prior to the actions alleged to be fiduciary violations. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-692.1(A) (2007).
32. In truth, the business judgment rule presumption as discussed in Aronson does
exactly the same thing as section 102(b)(7) in terms of the protection it affords to directors.
See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223-25 (Del. 1999) (stating that the "statu-
tory enactment of Section 102(b)(7) was a logical corollary to the common law principles
of the business judgment rule"). Apparently, corporate directors wanted even more assur-
ances than the business judgment rule presumption offered.
As an aside, as best I can tell, I am perhaps the only corporate law scholar who main-
tains that DGCL section 102(b)(7) does not insulate against duty of care violations if the
violation is a result of the director's failure to act in good faith. Phrased differently, as I
read Aronson together with DGCL section 102(b)(7), a stockholder in a corporation with a
102(b)(7) provision in its charter cannot sue for a duty of care violation if the claim is
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Together, the business judgment rule presumption and state statutes
such as DGCL section 102(b)(7) mean that a shareholder who is dissatis-
fied with the quality of management provided by disinterested direc-
tors,33 whom he elected to act on his behalf, only has a chance of making
it into the courtroom with a fiduciary duty claim if the director at issue
was conflicted or acted "not in good faith." As discussed in the introduc-
tion, it is for this reason that I maintain that the long-term health of cor-
porate governance will hinge in part on the reigning interpretation and
application of the phrase "not in good faith." To the extent that one be-
lieves, as I do, that a successful lawsuit imposing personal liability on a
director for acting in the absence of good faith has deterrent value or will
serve to induce directors to be more thoughtful in their decision-making,
the meaning and interpretation of "not in good faith" is far more signifi-
cant than appears at first glance.
II. GOOD FAITH, BAD FAITH, AND "NOT IN GOOD FAITH"
A. GOOD FAITH
Before addressing "not in good faith," it is necessary to define the
phrase "good faith" as it is relevant in the context of a director's actions.
A clear definition of good faith is critical both to give directors guidance
as to what is expected of them and to offer a standard against which to
gauge alleged failings. Interestingly, the judiciary and contemporary aca-
demics have generally either refrained from defining good faith when as-
sessing whether a director acted in good faith, or have defined the phrase
without discussion. 34 Therefore, I addressed in depth in a recent article
what it means for a director to act in good faith.35
based on the director's failure to become adequately informed prior to making a decision.
However, in my view, the "good faith" language in DGCL section 102(b)(7) leaves room
for a director to be sued on a duty of care claim that is founded or based on allegations of
the absence of good faith, as opposed to allegations that the directors were grossly negli-
gent in becoming informed.
33. For ease of analysis, I am limiting my discussion to disinterested directors to avoid
having to discuss the duty of loyalty and the issue of conflicted directors. Do not take this
to mean that I accede to the treatment by courts and most scholars of conflicted directors.
I do not-both constituencies tend to (a) be disinclined to find a conflict on any but the
most egregious of facts and (b) review even a conflicted director with a "fairness" review
that often strikes me as meager. To facilitate a more straightforward "not in good faith"
discussion, however, it is easier to limit the discussion to outside directors because they are
not inherently conflicted or interested such that the business judgment rule presumption or
DGCL section 102(b)(7) provisions are treated differently.
34. It is interesting that the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet thoughtfully ana-
lyzed and then defined "good faith" in the context of director liability, given the reputation
of the court as the ultimate arbiter of corporate law. To be fair, I have found no evidence
that the Delaware Supreme Court has been directly asked to define good faith. Indeed, in
the recent Disney shareholder litigation where the issue of whether or not the directors
acted in good faith was crucial, plaintiff-appellant's counsel did not even once propose an
affirmative definition of good faith. Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, In re Walt Dis-
ney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (No. 411, 2005), 2005 WL 2777912.
35. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director's Good Faith, 55 Burr. L. REV. 459 (2007).
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In that article, I closely examined the definition of good faith from
other areas of the law. I examined the role of good faith in the context of
director conduct, and I assessed the value of the phrase "good faith" in
the context of corporate governance. I concluded that importing a defini-
tion of good faith into the context of director conduct from other areas of
law is not ideal, because most definitions of good faith are context-spe-
cific. The director-shareholder-corporation relationship confounds even
the most well-established definition of "good faith" in the arms-length
context, such as in the commercial law context, where the definition of
"good faith" is generally agreed upon. That being said, I observed that
most good faith definitions include some common themes, such as de-
manding honesty, lack of ill-intentions, fairness, full disclosure, and sin-
cere attempts to honor an obligation. In addition, in the fiduciary
context, including the areas of agency, trust, and insurance, the notion of
good faith means "more than just the absence of the intent to harm. '36
Good faith in these contexts includes the obligation to protect the inter-
ests of the person being served or to use all of one's "power, influence,
and skill" to serve one's principal. 37 Taking honesty and an attempt to
honor one's agreements as a minimum and adding a definitional compo-
nent to account for the fiduciary nature of the director liability context, I
ultimately concluded that a sensible definition of good faith is "in the best
interests of the shareholders. ' 38 For purposes of the instant Article, I will
use this definition of good faith.39
36. See Shell Oil Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 588 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (quoting Smoral v. Hanover Ins. Co., 37 A.2d 23, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)).
37. Myer v. Preferred Credit, Inc., 117 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 32 (Ct. Com. P1. 2001) (af-
firming award of punitive damages for mortgage broker's improper, fraudulent, and dis-
honest dealings under the Mortgage Brokers Act).
38. Black's Law Dictionary defines "good faith" as:
A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness
to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to
defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.-Also termed bona fides.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (8th ed. 2004). However, beneath the definition is a para-
graph of text that seems to imply that good faith is not so easily defined. The paragraph
quotes the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in which it is noted that "[t]he phrase 'good
faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 cmt. a (1981)).
39. Admittedly, this good faith definition is not particularly novel or creative. Indeed,
it appears that my method of defining good faith is not even original:
The solution adopted here [to defining good faith] is to focus the inquiry by
means of a provisional definition of the principle based on two assumptions
which, it is submitted, are quite reasonable. The first is that any definition of
the principle must include the universally accepted good faith rule that 'con-
tracts' must be observed (pacta sunt servanda) and must also include the ele-
ments of honesty, fairness and reasonableness which have been indelibly
associated with the concept of good faith throughout centuries of legal
history.
J.F. O'Connor, Good Faith in English Law 11 (1990).
The second assumption is that a large part of the "normal" rules of any legal system will
reflect the substantive ethical content of good faith. A meaningful principle of good faith
must therefore be a common denominator of rules which are not simply normal rules of
the system concerned.
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What, then, does the phrase "not in good faith" mean? According to
the definition of good faith that I am adopting, not in good faith means
not in the best interests of the shareholders. But, as will be discussed
below, courts and academics in the corporate law realm tend instead to
fall back on the phrase "bad faith" when assessing whether a director
acted without the requisite good faith.40 This linguistic substitu-
tion-substituting bad faith for the absence of good faith41-might not ap-
pear to be of import, as the phrases are used interchangeably in casual
conversation. However, this linguistic substitution proves critical in the
context of shareholder protection and corporate governance. The ab-
sence of good faith and the affirmative existence of bad faith have two
distinct meanings with respect to a fiduciary such as a director,42 and sub-
stituting bad faith for not in good faith for purposes of the business judg-
ment rule presumption and DGCL section 102(b)(7) changes the
substance of the law in the corporate governance context.43 Moreover,
obligating a complaining shareholder to prove that a director acted in
affirmatively bad faith imposes a significantly heavier burden on the
shareholder than that imposed on a shareholder who is attempting to
prove that a director acted in the absence of good faith.
The next section will examine how courts and academics have used bad
faith as a shortcut to assessing whether a director failed to act in good
faith and analyze the meaning of the phrase "not in good faith."
B. BAD FAITH
Bad faith conduct is generally considered to be conduct that is tanta-
mount to fraud or "nearly unconscionable behavior."' 44 Proving bad faith
has been referred to as a "daunting" task.45 Bad faith requires "a wrong
Yet I devoted an entire law review article to examining the phrase "good faith" and
defining it-albeit not in an earth-shattering new way-in the context of director behavior
for reasons of strategy: I meticulously constructed a justifiable definition of good faith in
order to lay the foundation for analyzing the phrase "not in good faith." Though defining
good faith in the director liability context is important, defining good faith for purposes of
creating the foundation on which the phrases "the absence of good faith" or "acts or omis-
sions not in good faith" can be constructed is, to me, much more important.
40. The occasional court will mention the "not in good faith" rubric, but rarely, if ever,
is that phrase used as a measure for a director's conduct.
41. Throughout this Article, "in the absence of good faith," "not in good faith," "with-
out good faith," and similar phrases will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing.
In addition, for purposes of this discussion, definitional differences between "acts," "ac-
tions," "behavior," and "conduct" will be ignored. "Good faith acts," "good faith actions,"
"good faith conduct," "conduct indicating good faith," etcetera will be used to mean the
same thing.
42. Compare Part II.B with Part II.C, infra.
43. See infra Part II.D (examples provided in scenarios 1-4).
44. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Trust Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R. 1008, 1011-12
(N.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that a bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous when it found that
a guaranty company had acted in bad faith by soliciting a creditor subcontractor to join an
involuntary bankruptcy petition against a debtor general contractor).
45. United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999) (referring to a
statute that requires a showing of bad faith in federal criminal prosecutions).
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committed for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purposes. '46 To
prove bad faith, the complainant must "prove that a party consciously
committed a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious
purposes. '47
When assessing whether the complaining shareholders have success-
fully rebutted the presumption that the directors acted in good faith, Del-
aware courts often resort to an assessment of whether the plaintiff
shareholders have established that their directors acted in bad faith.48
46. Id. at 1299. See Aikens v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F. App'x 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing state breach of contract claims against
Microsoft: "[Tihe plaintiffs failed to allege how Microsoft acted with sinister or morally
questionable motives. Given these omissions, this Court cannot infer the essential ele-
ments of a bad faith breach of contract claim.").
47. Med. Specialist Group, P.A. v. Radiology Assocs., L.L.P., 171 S.W.3d 727, 734
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig. No. Civ. A. 20269, 2005 WL
1089021, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005):
Plaintiffs' good faith claims are merely a rehash of their duty of loyalty
claims. For all the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs fail to state a claim that the
Defendant directors' actions were predicated on bad faith. Therefore, be-
cause the Complaint contains no allegations that would allow the Court to
infer that the Hughes split-off was an irrational business decision or a trans-
action that amounted to waste, Counts I through IV are hereby dismissed in
their entirety.
Interestingly, one can find fiduciary duty opinions from Delaware courts where bad faith is
assessed, and, yet, good faith is never even mentioned. See, e.g., Unisuper Ltd. v. News
Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). In these cases, the obliga-
tion to act in good faith has quite literally morphed into the obligation not to act in bad
faith.
Indeed, in the twenty years since its 1986 Smith v. Van Gorkom decision, which is
roundly viewed as the definitive modern case marking a shift in director liability common
law, the Delaware Supreme Court has only once written about good faith in a way that
even roughly equated with an affirmative definition such that an assessment of what the
phrase "not in good faith" meant was possible. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985). In Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., the former Amsted shareholders chal-
lenged a management-sponsored buy-out, challenging the fairness of the buy-out price and
maintaining that the directors should have conducted a market test to fully assess the
prices for the purchase. The court arguably defined good faith when saying:
Thus, while numerous factors-timing, publicity, tax advantages, and Am-
sted's declining performance-point to the directors' good faith belief that
the shareholders were getting the best price, we decline to fashion an iron-
clad rule for determining when a market test is not required. The evidence
that will support a finding of good faith in the absence of some sort of market
test is by nature circumstantial; therefore, its evaluation by a court must be
open-textured. However, the crucial element for supporting a finding of good
faith is knowledge. It must be clear that the board had sufficient knowledge
of relevant markets to form the basis for its belief that it acted in the best
interests of the shareholders.
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989).
Every other time in the past twenty years that the Delaware Supreme Court has dealt
with a director's obligation to act in good faith, the court has done so by way of defining
and looking for the existence of bad faith. See, e.g., White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 546,
553-54 n.36 (Del. 2001) (alleging, in a derivative action, board failed to take action to stop
or sanction sexual misconduct of corporate officer).
To prevail on a waste claim or a bad faith claim, the plaintiff must overcome
the general presumption of good faith by showing that the board's decision
was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid
assessment of the corporation's best interests.
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For example, when considering whether a complaining shareholder rebut-
ted the presumption of good faith afforded to his directors under the bus-
iness judgment rule, Vice Chancellor Parsons examined whether the
shareholders proved bad faith, noting:
[B]ad faith is conduct that is "so far beyond the bounds of reasona-
ble judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground
other than bad faith.". . . . Bad faith is "not simply bad judgment or
negligence," but rather "implies the conscious doing of a wrong be-
cause of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity ... it contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will." 49
Similarly, in the context of a merger, Vice Chancellor Lamb used the
phrase "illicit motivation" to mean bad faith, obligating complaining
shareholders to establish that the directors affirmatively acted with an
illicit motivation.50 The Delaware Supreme Court has taken the position
that the business judgment rule presumption insulates a board's decision
from close scrutiny "in the absence of evidence of 'fraud, bad faith, or
self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment."' 51 The
way to overcome the presumption of good faith in what the Delaware
Supreme Court has deemed a "bad faith claim" is "by showing that the
board's decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been
based on a valid assessment of the corporation's best interests. '52
In a candid admission, Chancellor Chandler indicates that the bad faith
shorthand is used for purposes of ease:
Good faith has been said to require an "honesty of purpose," and a
genuine care for the fiduciary's constituents, but, at least in the cor-
porate fiduciary context, it is probably easier to define bad faith
rather than good faith.53
The Chancellor continues, observing:
Bad faith has been defined as authorizing a transaction "for some
purpose other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate welfare
or [when the transaction] is known to constitute a violation of appli-
cable positive law." In other words, an action taken with the intent
Id. at 554; see also Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 71 (Del.
1989) (describing how shareholder of purchased corporation sued former board of direc-
tors, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and gross negligence). The final opinion from the
Delaware Supreme Court in the recent Disney litigation deals with the meaning of not in
good faith, but the Delaware Supreme Court still never defines the phrase good faith. In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
49. McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1031, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2004) (searching for evi-
dence of bad faith regarding a DGCL section 102(b)(7) issue and a business judgment rule
issue).
50. In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining
that DGCL section 102(b)(7) allows claims that present a showing "that the directors' con-
duct was the product of bad faith").
51. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
52. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001).




to harm the corporation is a disloyal act in bad faith.54
With respect to the corporate law academics who have chimed in on
the good faith dialogue with respect to director liability, it appears that
most have implicitly accepted the "bad faith" substitution regarding a di-
rector's obligation to act in good faith. For example, Professor Hillary
Sale makes no attempt to define good faith in her article, Delaware's
Good Faith, and she instead says "[a]though a breach of good faith need
not be intentional or conscious, it does require some sort of obvious, de-
liberate, or egregious failure. ' 55 Professor David Rosenberg takes a very
robust view of the reach of good faith in his contractarian article, and he
states that "good faith is a circle around which all duties, corporate or
contractual, are surrounded. A director who agrees to adhere to the
terms of a corporate charter must do so in good faith .... "56 Professor
Rosenberg then defaults to language which makes clear that he has ac-
ceded to the position that a director's lack of good faith is assessed by
looking for bad faith. Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg, arguably one of the
founding fathers of modern corporate governance, seems to speak for
most of the academy when he says directly in his article: "For ease of
exposition, unless the context indicates otherwise, in the balance of this
article the terms action and conduct will be used interchangeably, and the
term lacks good faith will be used synonymously with the term in bad
faith."5 7
54. Id. (internal citations omitted). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court, and, in the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion, various articulations of "bad faith"
and "not in good faith" are approved. See infra Part IV.B.
55. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 493 (2004).
Oddly, after noting that a "breach of good faith need not be intentional or conscious," she
goes on to proclaim that the good faith "standard is like the standard of review applied to
pleadings of scienter in securities fraud claims: motive is relevant, but not required. Inten-
tional misstatements or omissions are actionable and intentional breaches of fiduciary du-
ties should be as well." Id. With due respect, it is unclear to me exactly what she means.
A breach of good faith does not need to be "intentional or conscious;" motive is not re-
quired. Yet it seems like the gist of her paragraph concludes that, in her view, some level
of intent or reckless disregard that is almost assumed to equate with intent is required. Id.
at 487 ("If the conduct at issue is sufficiently irresponsible ... good faith is implicated.").
Professor Sale continues to say that good faith conduct does not include conduct that is
"deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or knowing," though she does not tell us
what any of these terms mean. Id. at 488. In addition, at one point Professor Sale suggests
that "egregious, subversive, or deliberately indifferent conduct" does not evince good faith.
Id. at 490. It is unclear to me how deliberately indifferent conduct differs substantively
from normal indifference. Does Sale mean "malicious indifference" versus "indifference"
(perhaps "agnostic indifference")? I suppose that that is a subtlety much like the differ-
ence between "intentionally subversive conduct" (which would violate a director's fiduci-
ary duties according to Sale) and unintentionally subversive conduct.
56. David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary
Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 513 (2004).
57. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 21 (2006); see also Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469,
488 n.116-17 (2005) (substituting the phrase "bad faith" without discussion in the context
of DGCL section 102(b)(7)).
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C. NOT IN GOOD FAITH
If an act in good faith is an act in the best interests of the shareholder,
it follows that an act not in good faith is an act that is "not in the best
interests of the shareholder. '5 8 These acts "not in good faith" are the
acts for which directors are personally liable under statutes such as
DGCL section 102(b)(7) and the business judgment rule. A complaining
shareholder who maintains that her director did not act in good faith
could substantiate her position by showing how the director's acts were
not in the best interests of the shareholders.
While this focus on the absence of good faith might initially seem lin-
guistically curious and might appear to require proof of a negative, this
application actually mirrors the interpretation of "good" versus "not
good" from other contexts in normal daily life. Consider the situation
where a person is asked upon her return from the movie theater "was the
movie good?" If the movie-viewer was not pleased with or impressed by
the movie, she could say, "no, the movie was not good." The movie-
viewer's response is not limited to the response, "no, the movie was bad."
Indeed, the movie patron might be further asked, "well, was the movie
bad?" A reasonable response from the movie-viewer would be: "No, the
movie was not bad. It just was not good." What the movie-viewer would
be saying, loosely, is that the movie was mediocre. The movie was not
affirmatively bad, but it also was not good. The movie patron did not
leave the theater mid-way through the movie, but the movie patron
would not spend $3.99 to rent the movie when it becomes available for
rental.
And so it is with "not in good faith" in the director liability context.
The broad category of "not in good faith" includes any conduct that is not
in good faith, including bad faith conduct, agnostic conduct, almost good
faith conduct, and "no faith" conduct. Any conduct that is not "in the
best interests of shareholders" is not good faith conduct. This can be re-
duced to a simple proof, which is illustrated by a diagram below, evincing
the following principles:
1. Either an act is in good faith or the act is not in good faith,59
2. Good faith acts are acts in the best interests of the corporation/
shareholders, and
3. Acts not in good faith are acts that are not in the best interests of
the corporation/shareholders.
58. Either an act is "in good faith" or it is not, according to the law of the excluded
middle. Some would try to say that either an act is in good faith or in bad faith. This
exhibits a logical fallacy. Good faith and bad faith are not the only two "faith" categories
available. See Bertrand Russell, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1959).
59. Either a woman is pregnant or she is not. There is no middle ground.
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QUERY: Do the facts to which the complaining plaintiff is
pointing, when considered in the context of the director's
actions at issue on the topic of concern,
evince action that, at the time taken, was
"in the best interests of the shareholders?"
NOYES YES The acts at issue
The acts at issue are
cannot be said to be
"in the best interests in the best interests of
of the shareholders."shareholders.
The conduct is The conduct is
"In Good Faith" "ot In Good Faith"
A complaining shareholder-plaintiff who is trying to either rebut the
business judgment rule presumption or strip from a director the protec-
tion of a DGCL section 102(b)(7) charter provision could do so by identi-
fying facts that show that the acts of the directors do not fit within the
definition of "good faith."' 60
60. Some might worry that this analysis means that the directors will no longer auto-
matically be given the protection of the business rule presumption. That worry is not mer-
ited; the directors will still receive the benefit of the presumption. The burden will still be
on the plaintiffs to prove that the directors did not act in good faith, and, though "proving"
a negative is perhaps a counter-intuitive concept, it certainly is not an ethereal task from a
practical standpoint. If the plaintiffs cannot rebut the presumption of good faith by show-
ing that good faith acts-acts in the best interests of the shareholders-were actually lack-
ing or the acts at issue do not fit within the phrase "in the best interests of the
shareholders," a director will forever hold the business judgment rule presumption's pro-
tection in that case.
I had an interesting and related debate on the internet about this topic and these scena-
rios with armchair philosopher Benjamin Nelson. See Posting of Elizabeth Nowicki to
Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/06/the-disney-
opin.html (June 9, 2006, 17:59 EST) (my initial posting); Posting of Benjamin Nelson to
Law & Society Blog, http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/208 (June 10, 2006) (Nelson's
response); Posting of Elizabeth Nowicki to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurring
opinions.comlarchives/2006/06/benjaminnelson.html (June 20, 2006, 14:17 EST) (my re-
ply); Posting of Benjamin Nelson to Law & Society Blog, http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/
archives/210 (June 21, 2006) (Nelson's rejoinder).
In his June 21, 2006 post, Benjamin Nelson made the excellent point that, in some con-
texts, the absence of good faith is easily identified while it is also clear that bad faith (as the
word is used in the normative sense) is not at issue. To illustrate this point, Nelson made
reference to the Kitty Genovese case, which involved thirty-eight neighbors who allegedly
witnessed Kitty Genovese being stabbed (or beaten) to death in an alley and waited a half-
hour before calling the police. The witnesses had no mal-intentioned reason for not calling
the police; they were not acting affirmatively in bad faith, with the intent to harm Ms.
Genovese. They were not aligned with or "rooting for" Ms. Genovese's attacker. Rather,
the neighbors were impacted by what was later termed the "bystander effect," the ten-
dency to resist offering help when part of a group although the help would be freely of-
fered were the bystander alone. In such a case, could anyone credibly say that the
bystanders who saw Ms. Genovese get attacked but said nothing were acting "in good
Not in Good Faith
D. BAD FAITH VERSUS NOT IN GOOD FAITH
After discussing both the absence of good faith and the existence of
bad faith, the difference between the two as a matter of substance is clear:
Bad faith means "dishonesty of belief or purpose,"' 61 "dishonest motive
or purpose, ' 62 or the "conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity... [and] a state of mind affirmatively operat-
ing with furtive design or ill will."'63 The absence of good faith refers to
"acts not in the best interests of shareholders." The phrases are not sy-
nonymous, but the former is a sub-category of the latter, as the diagram
below indicates:64
This big outer circle includes all acts that are
"Not in Good Faith."
This inner circle includes acts
In BAD FAITH.
All acts in bad faith are also acts
"not in good faith,"
as these circles depict.
This "donut" between the "'bad faith" smaller circle
and the "not in good faith" bigger circle represents
the acts that are not "good faith" acts but are also
not "bad faith" acts. The acts that fall within this
donut are simply acts that are not in good faith.
These are acts evincing the absence of good faith.
faith"? I doubt anyone would take that position. But if the neighbors were not acting in
good faith and they were not acting in bad faith, there has to be another category. In
Nelson's (correct, in my opinion) view, the Kitty Genovese case clearly makes the point
that some conduct can neither be labeled "good faith" nor "bad faith," hence the "not in
good faith" category.
61. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 134 (8th ed. 2004).
62. BRITTINGHAM V. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT OF REHOBOTH BEACH, No. Civ. A.
03A-08-002 2005 WL 1653979, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005) (unpublished
opinion).
63. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equities Fund, II, L.P., 624
A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993).
64. An act lacking good faith is not necessarily the same as an affirmative act "in bad
faith" any more than a fruit that is "not an apple" is necessarily "an orange." A fruit that is
"not an apple" might be an orange, but it does not have to be. An act that is "not in good
faith" might be an act in bad faith, but it does not have to be. "Bad faith" behavior is a
sub-category of the "not in good faith" behavior category, and the "not in good faith"
category embraces much more than does the bad faith category.
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My observation that the absence of good faith is not the same as the
existence of bad faith is not novel. For example, in Art Form Interiors,
Inc. v. Columbia Homes, Inc., the court said: "We view with considerable
consternation the disturbing lack of good faith. . . , but we are not pre-
pared to hold that the appellants' actions constituted bad faith. '65 In
Zdravkovich v. Bell Atlantic- Trion Leasing Corp., the Maryland Court of
Appeals said that "[tihe District Court's finding that Zdravkovich 'has
not shown good faith' is not the equivalent to a finding of 'bad faith' and
cannot be the basis for the imposition of sanctions. '66 The court in Com-
monwealth v. Belcher offered that "[a]lthough the court finds no bad
faith, the court does not find good faith here either. '67 Judge Bistline, in
State v. Prestwich, observed in his concurrence that "[tIhe trial judge did
not find good faith; he only found lack of bad faith," concluding suc-
cinctly that "I submit that the two are not synonymous. '68 Similarly,
Richard Rector describes this distinction regarding a failure to act in
good faith versus an affirmative finding of bad faith as "noteworthy, if
slightly metaphysical" in the context of government contracts. Mr. Rec-
tor observes that "good and bad faith are not mirror images of one an-
other ... [a party] can fail to act in good faith without necessarily acting
in bad faith."'69
Ward v. Herr Foods, Inc. is a noteworthy case, as it involved a question
of awarding prejudgment interest when the standard for such referred to
both "good faith" and "not ... in good faith." The statute at issue al-
lowed a court to award prejudgment interest if
the court determines at a hearing held subsequent to the verdict or
decision in the action that the party required to pay the money failed
to make a good faith effort to settle the case and that the party to
whom the money is to be paid did not fail to make a good faith effort
to settle the case. 70
65. Art Form Interiors, Inc. v. Columbia Homes, Inc., 609 A.2d 370, 375 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992).
66. Zdravkovich v. Bell Atl.-Tricon Leasing Corp., 592 A.2d 498, 503 (Md. Ct. App.
1991).
67. Commonwealth v. Belcher, F88-140, 1988 WL 619393, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 18,
1988).
68. 783 P.2d 298, 302 (Idaho 1989) (Bistline, J., concurring). Additionally, some might
add the category of "no faith" to the categories of "good faith," "not in good faith," "bad
faith," and "not in bad faith." This "no faith" option was discussed in Thomas v. Western
World Insurance Co., when the court analyzed an insurance company's refusal to defend an
insured against the insurer's fiduciary obligation to exercise good faith in defending or
settling claims against an insured: "In the case before us, there is no threshold question of
'good faith' vs. 'bad faith.' For here, the company exercised no faith at all." 342 So. 2d
1298, 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
69. See Richard Rector, Infotech and the Law: Good Faith, Bad Faith in Government
Contracts, WASH. TECH., Jan. 22, 2001, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/
print/15-20/16188-1/html (quoting an Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals case in
which the board observed that "[t]he mere absence of bad faith ... does not mean the
government met its obligation ... to negotiate in good faith").
70. Ward v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. 456, 1990 WL 118868, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App Aug. 16.
1990) (emphasis added).
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The court observed that "one need not prove that the party acted in bad
faith but only that the party did not act in good faith."' 71 This case is
particularly interesting to consider because it implicates a party's affirma-
tive obligation to do something.72 When dealing with the failure to do
something that is required, to wit, make a good faith effort to settle, the
court refused to substitute the requirement of proving bad faith for the
requirement to merely identify facts evincing the absence of good faith.
As a definitional matter, then, it is clear that "bad faith" and "not in
good faith" do not mean the same thing. Substituting "bad faith" for the
absence of good faith changes the law. The impact of defining acts "not
in good faith" literally, as I am proposing, instead of defining acts that
lack good faith as only bad faith acts, 73 as many courts currently do, be-
comes apparent when dealing with cases involving director inattention or
abdication. For at least the past two decades, directors who could justifia-
bly be labeled "asleep at the wheel" when something devastating and pre-
ventable happened to the corporation could evade liability for acting "not
in good faith" because the directors did not intend to hurt the corpora-
tion. Directors who did not question acquisition-related fairness letters
written by the same investment bank that had been retained to find the
target, directors who failed to read financial statement footnotes closely
enough to realize their corporation had hundreds of special purpose enti-
ties, directors who signed off on the hiring and firing of top-level execu-
tives without being involved with or informed about the search process
and the executives selected, 74 and directors who did not inquire further
when they began seeing information on the annual reports about a rash
of product failure lawsuits could all evade fiduciary duty liability because
they were not affirmatively acting in bad faith or intending to harm their
corporate charges. As long as their inattention did not amount to "a con-
scious disregard for one's responsibilities, '75 which requires an actual
train of thought in the director's mind regarding whether he should fol-
low-up or ask questions, directors are beyond the reach of the phrase
"bad faith."
Under my definition of conduct that is "not in good faith," however,
directors who fail to follow-up on issues that seem to be red flags, fail to
ask questions on important matters, are inattentive in situations where
attention is required, and do other non-malicious things that evidence the
failure to act in the best interests of shareholders fall into the category of
"not in good faith," such that those directors will not be protected by the
business judgment rule presumption or exculpatory state statutes. Below
71. Id.
72. This obligation to affirmatively try to settle a case is similar to a director's obliga-
tion to affirmatively act in good faith.
73. Note that I am using "bad faith" as the phrase is normally used in the normative
sense, to mean something close to fraud or intentional, malicious conduct.
74. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
75. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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are a few examples of instances where this definitional distinction will be
noticeable:
SCENARIO 1:
Director Jones, who has only been a director for ten months, hears
through the grapevine that the CEO of the publicly-traded, Fortune 100
corporation that he serves is incredibly difficult to work with, such that
the company cannot retain other qualified senior executives. Director
Jones never raises the issue at a board meeting or informally with his
fellow outside directors. He is of the view that his fellow directors, all six
of whom have been on this board for several years, would be raising the
issue if it was a problem. 76
Is THIS "GOOD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is this failure to inquire further or
raise the issue with at least one other director an act in the best interests
of the shareholders?
No. The conduct is "NOT IN GOOD FAITH."
IS THIS "BAD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is Director Jones keeping quiet due to
a desire to harm the company or to serve himself? No.
SCENARIO 2:
Director Doe is on the board of a large, publicly traded corporation.
The day before Christmas, he receives a phone call from the General
Counsel of the corporation, telling Doe that he will be faxing to Doe a
board resolution to sign. The fax would authorize an award of stock op-
tions to the CEO, the CFO, and the COO, in accordance with the Stock
Option Plan, which affords these executives stock options, to be awarded
twice per year, on December 31 and June 31, if they meet the perform-
ance numbers set by the board for the previous six months. Doe queries
whether the senior officers have reached the required performance num-
bers, and the General Counsel affirms that they have. The General
Counsel faxes to Doe only the signature page for the directors' resolu-
tion, because the Associate General Counsel has not yet drafted the text
of the resolution. Doe receives the fax, he signs the resolution signature
page, and he faxes it back, not noticing that it is dated July 2.
Is THIS "GOOD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is the director acting affirmatively
in the best interests of the stockholders when he signs a document with-
out reading it? Is the director acting affirmatively in the best interests of
the stockholders when he signs a blanket resolution signature page with-
out ever seeing the actual resolutions themselves, which deal with a large
number of stock options?
No. When dealing with a document that has the potential to be impor-
tant, perhaps in terms of dollar amount or impact on the company or
76. Michael Eisner, recently ousted from the Disney helm, was well-known for his
inability to work well with others inside Disney. Joseph Menn, Quietly Keeping the Spot-
light on Disney; CEO Robert Iger has kept a low profile while mending fences broken under
his predecessor and forging key deals with Pixar and iTunes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at
C1.
[Vol. 60
Not in Good Faith
product issues, a director does not act in good faith if he signs the docu-
ment without reading it.
Is THIS BAD FAITH CONDUCT? No. There is no reason to believe that
Doe's lack of attention is egregious or motivated by an ill will. He did
not notice the July 2 date nor did he recall how the options were sup-
posed to be dated, given that he was not on the board when the option
plan was adopted.
THIS IS CONDUCT THAT IS JUST "NOT IN GOOD FAITH."
SCENARIO 3:
Director Smith is on a publicly traded, Fortune 100 corporation's three-
person compensation committee. She approves a costly executive pay
package for a new COO without ever seeing the final compensation
agreement. The agreement is being negotiated by the CEO and one of
the other compensation committee members who has served on the com-
mittee for over a decade. That committee member, Director Williams,
tells Director Smith that the new executive will be getting a pay package
worth approximately $138 million over five years (the actual value of the
stock options to be awarded is uncertain), and Williams assures Smith
that the amount is in line with the compensation being paid to the incum-
bent CEO.77
Is THIS "GOOD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is the failure by Director Smith to
insist on seeing, reading, or discussing the pay agreement or a specific
summary of the package an act that is "in the best interests of the
shareholders?"
No. Given that the pay package is for a top executive and is sizeable,
and given that the topic of "executive compensation" has been a net-
tlesome topic for corporations over the past several years, the failure of a
director who knows she is one of only three directors on a compensation
committee to be active in the compensation review process is not "in the
best interests of the shareholders."
Is THIS "BAD-FAITH" CONDUCT? Is this failure by Director Smith an
act that is a "conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity... [and] a state of mind affirmatively operating with fur-
tive design or ill will?" 78
No. Nothing in the facts indicates that Smith has a dishonest purpose
or is acting with ill will. THIS IS CONDUCT THAT IS MERELY "NOT IN GOOD
FAITH."
Note that if the pay package was clearly insignificant such that it did
not merit Smith's time and attention, voting on the package without see-
ing it or more fully reviewing it might not be an act not in good faith.
77. In the recent Disney litigation, outside Disney director Sidney Poitier, who sat on
the compensation committee charged with the task of reviewing Ovitz's pay package, es-
sentially asked no questions nor made any inquiry into the compensation he was voting to
offer Ovitz. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 906 A.2d, at 39-40.
78. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equities Fund, II, L.P., 624
A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993).
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Voting without seeing the package might actually be a wise expenditure
of her limited resources.. In some situations, close attention is not mer-
ited. This assessment is akin to the materiality assessment in the securi-
ties fraud context: At some point, some information is so clearly
insignificant as to be easily deemed by the court to be immaterial.
SCENARIO 4:
Director Lauder is on the board of a pharmaceutical company. At the
board meetings, held by teleconference every month, the Senior Execu-
tives rarely say more than a few words on product liability issues, given
that there are so many things on the agenda for discussion at each meet-
ing. After reading in the newspapers about the recent Bausch & Lomb
issues79 and the Vioxx litigation, 80 Director Lauder wonders how far a
potential products liability issue will develop before the Senior Execu-
tives bring the issue to the board. Lauder never gets around to asking the
Senior Executives that question; the board meetings are too busy, and
Lauder does not want to offend the Senior Executives by asking.
Is THIS "GOOD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is the director affirmatively acting
in the best interests of the stockholders when he sits complacently in an
industry (pharmaceuticals) where products liability issues do arise and ex-
pose companies to huge, potentially bankrupting liability?
PROBABLY NOT. While Director Lauder is certainly not acting in bad
faith, it would be difficult to say that a director acting in the best interests
of the shareholders would ask no questions to at least be apprised of what
sort of information he can expect (and when). Particularly given the na-
ture of the industry, the failure to ever ask about products liability issues
is probably an act "NOT IN GOOD FAITH. ''8 1
79. Bausch & Lomb was recently involved in a spate of complaints and lawsuits filed
against it, alleging that Bausch & Lomb's ReNu with MoistureLocT increased the risk of
its users suffering from Fusarium karatitis, an eye infection that could lead to blindness.
Bausch & Lomb Yanking Cleaner Tied to Infections, CHi. TRIB., May 16, 2006, at C3.
80. See Kris Hundley, Meet Merck, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at 1D (dis-
cussing significant liability and financial uncertainty that Merck faces as a result of linger-
ing Vioxx claims).
81. In the case of In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the court
recognized that there is a contextual element to the meaning of an action in the best inter-
est of shareholders:
The vocabulary of negligence while often employed, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) is not well-suited to judicial review of board atten-
tiveness, see, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), especially
if one attempts to look to the substance of the decision as any evidence of
possible "negligence." Where review of board functioning is involved, courts
leave behind as a relevant point of reference the decisions of the hypothetical
"reasonable person", who typically supplies the test for negligence liability. It
is doubtful that we want business men and women to be encouraged to make
decisions as hypothetical persons of ordinary judgment and prudence might.
The corporate form gets its utility in large part from its ability to allow diver-
sified investors to accept greater investment risk. If those in charge of the
corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses on the basis of a
substantive judgment based upon what an persons [sic] of ordinary or aver-
age judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as "prudent" "sensi-
ble" or even "rational", such persons will have a strong incentive at the
margin to authorize less risky investment projects.
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Is THIS "BAD-FAITH" CONDUCT? Is this failure by Director Lauder an
act that is "so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it
seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith"? 82
No. Nothing in the facts indicates that Lauder has a dishonest purpose
or is acting with ill will. THIS IS CONDUCT THAT IS MERELY "NOT IN GOOD
FAITH."
SCENARIO 5:
For two consecutive years, under the "Risks" heading in the annual
report, Widget Corporation has reported new lawsuits brought by female
former employees who allege that they were discriminated against by
Widget's Senior Vice President of Human Resources. Director Loe
asked the General Counsel ("GC") about the lawsuits, and the GC said
that the lawsuits were not really a matter of concern. These lawsuits usu-
ally settle for a nominal amount of money, he said. He explained that the
Senior Vice President of Human Resources ("SVP") was just an old-fash-
ioned male who felt that women should stay in the kitchen, barefoot and
pregnant. The brand managers for each of Widget's three biggest product
lines apparently felt the same way, so the SVP never sent them female
job applicants. The GC said the four men were just artifacts who had
never gotten over the movement of women into the workplace fifty years
ago, and, despite religiously attending the annual diversity and workplace
equality training, these four men could not seem to fully shed their biases.
The good news, said the GC, was that these four men were brilliant and
made Widget Corporation significant amounts of money. Loe leaves well
enough alone, although she admonished the GC to "stay on top of this."
Is THIS "GOOD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is Loe's failure to follow-up on this
potential landmine of liability "in the best interests of the shareholder?"
No. Her failure to act is conduct that is "NOT IN GOOD FAITH." Given
the nature of the issue-lawsuits and sexual harassment-and given the
Indeed, one wonders on what moral basis might shareholders attack a good faith business
decision of a director as "unreasonable" or "irrational". Where a director in fact exercises a
good faith effort to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should be
deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention. If the shareholders thought themselves enti-
tled to some other quality of judgment than such a director produces in the good faith
exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have elected other directors.
Judge Learned Hand made the point rather better than can I. In speaking of the passive
director defendant Mr. Andrews in Barnes v. Andrews, Judge Hand said:
True, he was not very suited by experience for the job he had undertaken,
but I cannot hold him on that account. After all it is the same corporation
that chose him that now seeks to charge him .... Directors are not specialists
like lawyers or doctors .... They are the general advisors of the business and
if they faithfully give such ability as they have to their charge, it would not be
lawful to hold them liable. Must a director guarantee that his judgment is
good? Can a shareholder call him to account for deficiencies that their votes
assured him did not disqualify him for his office? While he may not have
been the Cromwell for that Civil War, Andrews did not engage to play any
such role.
698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996) (quoting Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1924)).
82. McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1031 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citations omitted).
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potential size of the issue-there were four managers who discriminated
on gender, presumably against many women-Loe's failure to ask for
further information or bring the issue to the attention of her colleagues is
not in the best interests of the shareholders. Does this mean that Direc-
tor Loe needed to micro-manage the hiring and firing of employees? No.
A director acting "in the best interests of the shareholder" does not need
to fully resolve the issue herself; she needs, rather, to do something that
advances the ball in terms of protecting the shareholders. That might
include asking the GC to have someone evaluate the size of the potential
exposure, raising the issue at a board meeting, or simply saying to the
GC: "This issue troubles me. Let's discuss it further." Doing almost
nothing regarding an issue that has at least some superficial indicia of the
reasonable potential to turn into a material problem for the corporation
is not an act in good faith.
Is THIS "BAD FAITH" CONDUCT? Is Loe's failure to follow-up on this
potential liability exposure evidence of a conscious doing of a wrong?
No.
IIl. BAD FAITH FALL-OUT
As the examples above indicate, the (mis)interpretation and
(mis)application of the phrase "not in good faith" has significant practical
ramifications when dealing with instances of corporate devastation due to
director inattention. As the law exists now, inattention has to rise to the
level of "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's
responsibilities," before it is subject to scrutiny as an act of "bad faith."'83
Yet the literal interpretation of "not in good faith" captures conduct far
less dramatic than that. In addition to the fact that the absence of good
faith and the existence of bad faith just do not mean the same thing, such
that corporate law jurists and academics who substitute the latter for the
former are mangling the law, there are at least two other important cor-
porate governance implications of this sloppy wordsmithing in the corpo-
rate law realm:
(1) Obligating a plaintiff to affirmatively prove bad faith is very differ-
ent and more demanding than obligating the complaining shareholder to
prove that good faith is lacking. The burden of proof in the former case is
much heavier.
(2) Substituting "bad faith" for "not in good faith" has the effect of
turning a director's affirmative obligation to act in good faith into the
mere obligation not to deliberately do bad acts with a venal motive. This
changes the nature of a director's role from that of a fiduciary to that of-
an arms-length party to a transaction.
With respect to the first point, as discussed in Part II.B, bad faith is
provable in the corporate law context by showing "that the board's deci-
83. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) (citations
omitted).
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sion was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a
valid assessment of the corporation's best interests," or that the decision
"is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essen-
tially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith." 84 Even the least
demanding of bad faith articulations from the Delaware courts requires
substantiation that the directors "consciously and intentionally disre-
garded their responsibilities.'85 Bad faith is focused more on mental state,
and it has a clear subjective bent. Yet, as discussed above, an act "not in
good faith" refers to conduct that simply does not represent an act in the
best interests of the shareholder. Mental state is irrelevant. "Not in good
faith" focuses on the goal of the conduct at issue. Was the act or was the
act not in the best interests of shareholders based on the facts available at
the time?86 Obligating shareholders to instead prove that ill-intentions
drove a director's conduct saddles the shareholder with an onerous evi-
dentiary burden.
With respect to the second point, recall that directors are fiduciaries,
and a fiduciary is obligated to affirmatively try to advance the interests of
the party she serves. The fiduciary has a duty-an obligation-to act in
the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation. It is not
enough for a fiduciary to just refrain from deliberately doing bad acts.87
More is required of a director qua fiduciary than is required of parties to
an arms-length transaction.
Introducing bad faith to the discussion of a director's fiduciary duties
eviscerates the affirmative nature of a director's obligation to act in good
faith. Inasmuch as "bad faith" acts basically include only egregious and
intentional acts-acts such as "fraud" or deliberately reckless behavior-
courts are changing the fiduciary nature of a director's role by freeing the
director from the obligation to exercise a level of attention and monitor-
ing that rises to the level of "in the best interests of the shareholder." For
a fiduciary-someone who has the obligation to act affirmatively on be-
half of and for the best interests of the shareholder-the elimination of
84. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001).
85. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (empha-
sis in original).
86. This more objective articulation has been described as follows:
What is required is that the directors must do what they honestly believe to
be right-i.e. subjective good faith-and ... they will normally succeed in
satisfying this test unless it can be shown (objectively) that they have not
behaved in accordance with the standards expected of honest and reasonable
men of affairs. Even if directors have not been consciously dishonest, they will
be in breach of their duty if they have not considered whether their action is in
the interests of the company.
J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN ENGLISH LAW 53-54 (1990).
87. The adage for a fiduciary relationship, at least in the corporate governance realm,
should be "First, try to do some good." Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 513 ("Fiduciary du-
ties are substantive obligations which must be honored in good faith in the same way that
contractual obligations must be honored in good faith.").
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liability for inattentiveness is preposterous. 88
If courts and academics continue to substitute the phrase "bad faith" 89
for the phrase "not in good faith," the fundamental fiduciary nature of
the director role will be eroded to essentially that of a disinterested con-
tractual third party, and, more troubling, shareholders will find them-
selves left holding stock governed by new, unilaterally changed rules.90
The shareholders will be left with a directorate that cannot be held ac-
countable for essentially being "asleep at the wheel" because the subjec-
tive aspect of bad faith is lacking in most cases of inattention. That
simply cannot be acceptable behavior under the definition of "good
faith" as it pertains to a fiduciary. 91 Good faith cannot contemplate a
88. Id.; see Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54
AM. U.L. REV. 75, 117 (2004) ("[A] director's fiduciary duty entails positive actions to
benefit the corporation and its shareholders ....").
89. Note that, under some definitions of "bad faith," conduct that is less egregious
than fraud or something of that ilk--conduct that I refer to as "other" not in good faith
conduct-is indeed reachable as "bad faith" conduct. For example, Black's Law Diction-
ary makes reference to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981),
which provides that bad faith includes things such as "lack of diligence and slacking off"
and "willful rendering of imperfect performance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (8th ed.
2004). Under this definition of bad faith, conduct that I reach with my "not in good faith"
language-conduct that falls short of overt fraud-would easily be included.
My fear about the corporate bar, judiciary, and academics trying to substitute the phrase
"bad faith" for the phrase "acts or omissions not in good faith" assumes those parties
would not adopt the broader reading of "bad faith," but, rather, would continue using bad
faith narrowly to only mean something akin to or very close to fraud.
90. Embracing the contractarian view of the firm does not result in a different mean-
ing of the phrase "not in good faith." Perhaps, at first glance, one might think exactly the
opposite: The director's relationship with the corporation and its shareholders is viewed as
a contractual, arms-length relationship, such that it is inappropriate to inject fiduciary prin-
ciples. But, actually, the fiduciary contours of the "contractual" corporate relationship
would inform the way "good faith" should be used as a gap-filler, and the fiduciary nature
of the director's role in general would be used as the default perspective from which to
interpret the director's agreement-contract-with the shareholders. See E. Allan Farns-
worth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 672 (1963).
Good faith performance as used in the realm of contract and commercial law emphasizes
"faithfulness to an agreed common purpose" and "consistency with the justified expecta-
tions of the other party." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. a (1981).
With respect to the "asleep at the wheel" director or the "too busy to have noticed" direc-
tor, he clearly is not emphasizing any sort of faithfulness to an agreed common purpose
unless the agreed common purpose was for the director to do a half-hearted job of serving
the corporation. From that standpoint, when asking whether a director failed to fulfill his
contractual obligation to act in good faith, Professor Farnsworth would suggest we should
favor the party with less control and power (in the corporate context, the shareholder) as
we make our assessment. Farnsworth, supra note 90, at 672. In addition, the general fidu-
ciary nature of the relationship and the trust and confidence aspect of the relationship
would inform the contractarian's interpretation of good faith for purposes of filling gaps:
"Fiduciary duties minimize agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and
from management rights." Larry Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 IowA J. CORP. L.
819, 845 (2001) (citing Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory Of The Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976)); see
also Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 426-27 (1993).
91. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A fiduciary duty is the duty
of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good
faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as the agent would treat himself."); Swinney v.
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lack of attention paid to that with which the fiduciary has been entrusted
and has voluntarily agreed to keep watch over in return for a salary.92
How, then, did we get here? Below I examine a few critical issues im-
plicated in the misevolution of director liability for fiduciary duty
violations.
IV. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REVISITED
Changing a director's affirmative fiduciary obligation to well-manage a
shareholder's assets into the mere obligation to refrain from intentionally
causing harm to the corporation might seem inexplicable to an outsider.
The range of the director abdication categories of cases totally beyond
the reach of a court using the phrase "bad faith" is huge. Any corporate
law scholar, however, is familiar with the reasons underpinning the re-
fusal of courts and academics to interpret reasonably a director's obliga-
tion to act in good faith.
Courts, academics, and the corporate defense bar are largely adamant
that directors must be insulated from personal liability except in the most
egregious cases in order to avoid (a) a drought in available, qualified,
willing directors and (b) a directors' and officers' "insurance crisis." This
position was cemented in 1985, when the Delaware Supreme Court re-
fused to dismiss a fiduciary duty-based lawsuit against the directors of the
Trans Union Corporation in the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.93
Only by showing how directors were never over-exposed to liability
and how their fears are misplaced is there any hope that corporate law
will evolve in a way that reflects the true meaning of the phrase "not in
good faith." To that end, this section does three things:
1. Show how Smith v. Van Gorkom was unremarkable, such that it did
not merit any sort of fear of increased liability exposure;
2. Explain how the director's and officer's insurance crisis fear was and
is unfounded;
Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 1973) ("[I]f the sellers of control [majority share-
holders] are in a position to foresee the likelihood of fraud on the corporation ... their
fiduciary duty imposes a positive duty to investigate the motives and reputation of the
would-be purchaser .... "); Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 211 P. 353, 355 (Mont. 1922)
("[T]he fiduciary relationship existing between the United States and the particular Indian
wards imposed upon the government a positive duty to lease the Indian lands and to secure
for the Indians the most advantageous terms available .... "); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d 495, 507 (N.J. 1974) ("[A]n insurer.., has a positive fiduciary
duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy
coverage.").
92. Prior to the 1900's, directors had mainly been "gratuitous mandatories," with no
paid salaries. Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Mismanagement, 65 U. PA. L.
REV. 128, 129 (1916). In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, directorates
evolved into well-paid, "coveted" positions. Id. at 132 ("It is the merest sophism to speak
of a modern director as a gratuitous [sic] mandatory."). It is at that point that courts began
to more closely hold directors accountable as fiduciaries. Id.
93. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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3. Debunk the myth that holding directors liable for failing to act in
good faith will result in a problematic unwillingness of qualified directors
to serve.
A. THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT CASE OF SMITH V.
VAN GORKOM
Smith v. Van Gorkom94 merits its own section in this paper for two
reasons: (1) Van Gorkom led to the adoption of DGCL section 102(b)(7)
and the chorus of naysayers warning of a director liability insurance crisis,
and (2) Van Gorkom is a duty of care case referred to by many corporate
law scholars and practitioners as a seminal case,95 yet it is painfully misin-
terpreted. This case, wherein the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
Delaware Chancery Court's interpretation and assessment of a board of
directors' alleged failure to satisfy their duty of care, set off a chorus of
wailing from the corporate bar, with practitioners and academics com-
plaining bitterly about the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion and the
corporate ruin that was sure to follow. The holding in Van Gorkom sent
shockwaves of fear through corporate boardrooms, and a directors' and
officers' liability insurance crisis was anticipated. As noted, it was the
holding in Van Gorkom which led to the hasty, and misled, adoption of
DGCL section 102(b)(7). It is useful, then, to discuss the case in some
detail.
1. The Facts
Trans Union was a publicly traded company whose principal earnings
were generated by its railcar leasing business. 96 While the company had a
strong cash flow, it had difficulties in generating enough taxable income
to offset its investment tax credits ("ITCs"). 97 Seeking to address this
issue, Trans Union lobbied Congress to have ITCs be refundable in cash
to firms that could not utilize the credits and also pursued an acquisition
program designed to increase available taxable income by acquiring the
taxable income of other target businesses. 98 By late summer of 1980, Je-
rome Van Gorkom, Trans Union's Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
ficer,99 was under the belief that Congress would not follow Trans
Union's suggestion about refunding ITCs in cash.100 In July of 1980,
94. Id.
95. Sandra K. Miller, Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the
European Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and
French "Close Corporation Problem", 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 381, 427 n.179 (1997) (char-
acterizing Van Gorkom as a "seminal case"); Charles M. Elson, Corporate Law Sympo-
sium: The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649,
676-77 (1995) (discussing how the Van Gorkom court created "a number of new and im-
portant guideposts to 'informed' decisionmaking").
96. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 864-65.
99. Id. at 864.
100. Id. at 865.
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Trans Union's management presented to its Board of Directors
("Board") a report indicating that Trans Union would have a cash surplus
of about $195 million and the ITC problem continued to be a "nagging
problem. ' 101 The report listed four alternative uses for the cash surplus:
(1) stock repurchase; (2) dividend increases; (3) a major acquisition pro-
gram; and (4) a combination of the above.'0 2 The report did not mention
the sale of Trans Union, and the report specifically stated that there had
not yet been "sufficient time to fully develop [a] course of action. 1 0 3
Van Gorkom took it upon himself to pursue the sale of Trans Union to
an entity that could use Trans Union's ITCs, and Van Gorkom called an
unexpected meeting of the Trans Union Board to spring upon them his
decision to support an acquisition of Trans Union by corporate takeover
specialist Jay Pritzer.'0 4 The Board approved the buy-out by Pritzer after
only two hours of discussion, without having seen a copy of the deal pro-
posal or a draft merger agreement.1 0 5 That same day, Van Gorkom
signed the agreement at a formal social affair that he was hosting.1 0 6
Neither Van Gorkom nor any other members of the Board read the
merger agreement before Van Gorkom signed it.107
When the acquisition was announced, Trans Union senior management
publicly balked at the agreement and threatened resignation. 0 8 As a re-
sult, Van Gorkom agreed to negotiate modifications to the merger agree-
ment to mollify management. Although Van Gorkom did negotiate
modifications, which the Board later approved, these modifications, con-
trary to the representations made by Van Gorkom, did not assuage any of
the senior management's concerns. 10 9
In February of 1981, a majority of the Trans Union stockholders ap-
proved the Pritzker acquisition." 0 Plaintiff stockholders then filed suit
against the directors of Trans Union, requesting, among other things,
damages resulting from the Board's breach of their duty of care in ap-
proving the sale of Trans Union.' Following a trial, the Court of Chan-
cery granted judgment for the defendant directors, finding that the




103. Id. at 865.
104. Id. at 865, 867.





109. Id. at 870. Rather, the amendments authorized by Van Gorkom essentially wors-
ened some of the issues concerning management by constraining Trans Union's ability to
negotiate a better deal or to withdraw from the agreement entered into with Pritzker.
110. Id. Only 69.9% of the outstanding Trans Union shares were voted for the sale of
Trans Union, while 7.25% were voted against, and 22.85% were not voted. Id.
111. Id. at 863-64.
112. Id. at 864.
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On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, the plaintiff stockholders
achieved a very different result. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that the Court of Chancery's rulings were clearly erroneous, and "the
Board's decision ... to approve the proposed cash-out merger was not
the product of an informed business judgment. 11 3 The Delaware Su-
preme Court issued an opinion reversing the ruling of the Court of Chan-
cery and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing on damages (i.e.,
the fair value of the plaintiffs' Trans Union shares). 114
The Supreme Court of Delaware disagreed with the Court of Chan-
cery's holding that the Board's approval of the Pritzker merger proposal
was protected by the business judgment rule, and the court concluded
that the Board failed to reach an informed business judgment when they
agreed to sell Trans Union.11 5 The Delaware Supreme Court focused on
three things: (1) the Board failed to adequately inform themselves about
Van Gorkom's role in the sale of Trans Union and in setting the per share
purchase price; (2) the Board was uninformed about the intrinsic value of
the company; and (3) given these informational failures, the Board was,
at a minimum, grossly negligent in approving the sale of Trans Union
after only two hours of discussion, without having considered the possibil-
ity previously, and in acting so quickly on such a significant issue in the
absence of a crisis or emergency.116
The court noted that the Board approved the cash-out merger based
solely on Van Gorkom's twenty-minute oral presentation about the
merger proposal, and the Board failed to review any documents (or ask
for a written summary of the merger terms) before approving Pritzker's
proposal.117 Further, although the Trans Union shares were purchased at
a price that represented a premium over the price at which the shares
were then trading, the court held that, in the "absence of other sound
valuation information," a premium alone would not be an adequate basis
for the Board to assess the fairness of Pritzker's offer.1 18 Trans Union's
market price was known by the Board to be historically undervalued, yet
the Board sought no other valuation information in determining that the
offered premium over Trans Union's $38 market price per share was a
fair value. 1 9 No director asked for a review of the valuation calculations
or an explanation of what the "fair price range" for Trans Union securi-
ties covered.' 20 The court rejected the notion that the Board's "collective
113. Id. at 864.
114. Id. at 893.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 869, 873, 893.
117. Id. at 869.
118. Id. at 875.
119. Id. at 876.
120. Id. at 877. Although the court noted that an outside valuation or a fairness opin-
ion by independent investment bankers was not absolutely necessary to support an in-
formed business judgment, the Board was not informed enough in this case to reach an
informed business judgment as to the fairness of the $55 per share purchase price for Trans
Union's shares. Id. at 876.
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experience and sophistication" provided a sufficient basis for concluding
that they reached an informed business judgment regarding the
acquisition. 121
The court ultimately concluded that "Trans Union's Board was grossly
negligent in that it failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation in
agreeing to the Pritzker merger proposal,"'1 22 and the record compelled
the conclusion that "the Board lacked valuation information adequate to
reach an informed business judgment as to the fairness of the $55 per
share for sale of the Company.' 23 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the trial court erred in affording to the defendant directors the protec-
tions of the business judgment rule,124 and the Board was liable to the
complaining shareholders for the fair value of their shares.' 2 5
2. The Bar's Response
This holding took the corporate defense bar by surprise. The Court of
Chancery in this case originally had found easily for the defendant direc-
tors, and duty of care cases in Delaware that had been decided in favor of
stockholders were few and far between. Therefore, with seemingly little
attention paid to the egregious facts of the Van Gorkom case, the corpo-
rate bar rallied to object mightily to the Delaware Supreme Court's hold-
ing.126 The objectors took the position that the holding in Van Gorkom
(a) was a travesty of justice, achieving a horribly wrong result, (b) had
created a directors' and officers' insurance ("D&O insurance") crisis,
precluding many corporations from being able to afford D&O insurance,
and (c) was going to chill the willingness of qualified potential directors
to serve corporations for fear of personal liability. 27
The corporate bar-controlled Delaware legislature responded to the
outcries following Van Gorkom quickly and aggressively. Within twelve
months of the Delaware Supreme Court's Van Gorkom opinion, the Del-
aware legislature adopted DGCL section 102(b)(7). 128 As discussed in
Part I, this statutory provision allows corporations to include in their cer-
tificate of incorporation a provision insulating outside directors of the
corporation from personal monetary liability for almost all fiduciary duty
121. Id. at 880.
122. Id. at 881.
123. Id. at 878.
124. Id. at 888.
125. Id. at 893.
126. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45
ALA. L. REV. 783, 793-94 (1994) (summarizing the holding of Van Gorkom and the corpo-
rate bar's reaction to the case); see also Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on
Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985) (noting that the corpo-
rate bar viewed the Van Gorkom decision as "atrocious").
127. See Loewenstein, supra note 126, at 793-94; E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkel-
stein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Lim-
ited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399, 400-01 (1987).
128. See Lowenstein, supra note 126, at 794, 815 n.45.
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breaches except acts "not in good faith."'129
3. The Impropriety of the Bar's Response
The Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Van Gorkom should not
have surprised any board or corporate law attorney, and the holding did
not call to be met by a caitiff legislative reaction. The holding in Van
Gorkom was consistent with prior case law, created no new or heightened
liability standards for directors, and the facts at issue in Van Gorkom
were particularly egregious, such that it made sense to hold the directors
of Trans Union liable for their unconsidered actions (and failures to act).
Moreover, the language used by the court in Van Gorkom should not
inspire fear in the thoughtful director. Specifically, the court said that
"Trans Union's Board was grossly negligent in that it failed to act with
informed reasonable deliberation in agreeing to the Pritzker merger pro-
posal,"'130 and the record compelled the conclusion that "the Board
lacked valuation information adequate to reach an informed business
judgment as to the fairness of the $55 per share for sale of the Com-
pany. 1 31 With respect to the "grossly negligent" point, note that the
court did not say "the Board was negligent and is therefore liable." In-
stead, the court used the phrase "grossly negligent" to qualify the phrase
"failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation."' 132 Neither of those
two phrases imposed any new standard. Negligence (or gross negligence)
had always been invoked in the context of director liability, and the "in-
formed reasonable deliberation" requirement already existed.133
With respect to the facts in the Van Gorkom case, it is unlikely that that
level of irresponsible decision-making will be replicated in a thoughtful
boardroom. To begin with, the Van Gorkom case involved a merger. Ac-
quisitions, dissolutions, mergers, and changes in control have always been
treated by the courts with particular care. The extra scrutiny to which
these transactions have always been subjected reflects the import of
129. Specifically, this exculpatory legislation provides that a corporation can include in
its certificate of incorporation:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit
the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
(iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the direc-
tor derived an improper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007).
130. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
131. Id. at 878.
132. Id. at 874 (the directors were "grossly negligent in approving the 'sale' of the Com-
pany upon two hours' consideration") (emphasis added).
133. Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" Law Nor "Bad"
Law, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429, 430 (1986) (contending that Van Gorkom "represents a
reiteration of existing Delaware law").
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change-in-control events in the "life" of a corporation. 34 Yet despite the
critical nature of the transaction at issue, the Trans Union Board was un-
informed (and was content to remain uninformed) about the intrinsic
value of the company and about the key merger terms, such as the exis-
tence (and effect) of a lock-up provision and Trans Union's ability to call
off the acquisition. Moreover, even if the Trans Union Board had
gleaned the minimum level of information that they needed to reach an
informed decision, the Board did not carefully deliberate on the acquisi-
tion in a way that was consistent with the exercise of due care. The Board
approved the sale of Trans Union after only two hours of discussion, with-
out having previously considered a sale at all. Moreover, there were no
extenuating circumstances that mandated quick action on a significant is-
sue.135 Despite these circumstances, the merger agreement ultimately
signed by Van Gorkom was not reviewed, even in summary form, by the
Board, and the actual document was signed by Van Gorkom at a social
event he was hosting.
On these facts, the holding in the Van Gorkom case should not have
come as a surprise to any savvy corporate lawyer. Clearly, "Trans
Union's Board was grossly negligent in that it failed to act with informed
reasonable deliberation in agreeing to the Pritzker merger proposal,"' 136
and "the Board lacked valuation information adequate to reach an in-
formed business judgment as to the fairness of the $55 per share for sale
of the Company. ' 137 Van Gorkom stands for the unremarkable proposi-
tion that directors need to inform themselves prior to voting on big-ticket
items such as the sale of the corporation. If anything, this proposition
should have been reassuring to the corporate bar (as opposed to provok-
ing the call for legislative action): If directors inform themselves prior to
making a decision (actually, "try, in a way that is not grossly negligent, to
inform themselves"), they will be insulated from liability, even if their
decision is, in hindsight, bad.138
134. That is to say, a shareholder holding stock in a corporation that is to be acquired,
to be dissolved, or to experience a change in control stands to have the true nature of her
holding changed.
135. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
136. Id. at 881.
137. Id. at 878.
138. To that end, the court in Van Gorkom goes so far as to discuss DGCL section
141(e), and the court indicates that the Trans Union board could have informed itself
about the proposed sale by asking officers and outside experts for reports, appraisals, and
opinions on the sale. Id. at 874-76. (DGCL section 141(e) provides that directors, in per-
formihg their duties, shall be fully protected from liability in relying in good faith upon
reports prepared by outside experts or officers.). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)
(2007); accord Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-75; Michaelson v. Duncan, 386 A.2d 1144,
1156 (Del. Ch. 1978). The court did not require the directors to over-exert themselves in
looking for every available piece of informational minutia about the proposed sale-the
directors could have delegated in good faith the actual fact-gathering, technical, tedious
portion of the task of becoming informed. Id.
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B. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INSURANCE
As noted above, the Delaware legislature adopted DGCL section
102(b)(7) in response to a perceived "directors' and officers' insurance
liability crisis" following the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v.
Van Gorkom.139 It was feared that the perceived D&O insurance crisis
and directors' fears of more personal liability threatened to dry up the
market for qualified corporate leadership. Yet there exists no compelling
evidence that there was in 1986 or shortly thereafter a true insurance "cri-
sis" such that the fear of the potential director pool drying up was valid.
Moreover, DGCL section 102(b)(7)'s legislative history provides no
meaningful, quantitative evidence of such.140 Indeed, the legislative his-
139. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (stating that DGCL section 102(b)(7)
"was adopted by the Delaware General Assembly in 1986 following a directors and officers
insurance liability crisis and the 1985 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom"); see Jeffrey P. Weiss, The Effect of Director Liability Statutes on Corporate Law
and Policy, 14 J. CORP. L. 637, 643 (1989) (noting that "the Delaware General Assembly
responded to the Van Gorkom decision and to the director and officer insurance crisis" by
adopting DCGL sections 102(b)(7) and 145(c)); Kristin A. Linsley, Comment, Statutory
Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and
the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 527, 529 (1987) (citing section
102(b)(7) and noting that its stated purpose is "to help alleviate the perceived crisis in the
availability of liability insurance for directors"); see also JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS LEE HA-
ZEN, & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS 201 (1997) ("[T]he impetus for these exonerat-
ing statutes was decisions, such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, that appear to be exposing
outside-director judgments to closer scrutiny and to the difficulties many corporations
were then experiencing in obtaining adequate levels of liability insurance.") (citations
omitted); Balotti & Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware
Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 7-8 (1987); Steven J. Schleicher, Comment, Director
Liability Dilemma: Providing Relief for Executive Anxiety, 56 UMKC L. REv. 367, 367-69
(1988); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 127, at 400-01.
140. For quite some time, I tried unsuccessfully to find the entire legislative history of
DGCL section 102(b)(7) so that I could independently assess the basis for its adoption. I
finally stumbled across a student comment from the 1987 Harvard Journal on Legislation
which indicated to me that I was having a hard time finding the legislative history for
DGCL section 102(b)(7) because the legislature did not draft this legislation. Linsley,
supra note 139, at 530-31. Instead, a lawyer in private practice in Wilmington, Delaware,
A. Gilchrist Sparks III (Mr. Sparks was the defense counsel in Van Gorkom), drafted the
text of the legislation. See Ron Ostroff, Delaware Law Could Limit Director Liability,
L.A. DAILY J., June 23, 1986, at 3, col.1 (identifying A. Gilchrist Sparks III as the draft
bill's author); see also Letter from L. Black, Jr., A. Sparks III & J. Johnston of Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., to Clients (May 7, 1986) (on file with author)
(discussing the drafted legislation, with a "proposed amendments" memo attached to the
Letter to Clients) [hereinafter Sparks Letter]. Mr. Sparks drafted the legislation (perhaps
with the advice of or input from the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Associ-
ation), and his draft appears to have been adopted by the Delaware legislature and gover-
nor without much, if any, debate.
The "legislative history," then, such as it is, for DGCL section 102(b)(7) consists of three
documents:
1. The Sparks Letter,
2. The attachment to the Sparks Letter, titled "Proposed Amendments to Sections 102
and 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law" [hereinafter Proposed Amendments
Memo], and
3. The Synopsis to Delaware S.B. No. 533, 133D Gen. Assem. (1986) [hereinafter Sy-
nopsis to Amendments].
The Synopsis to Amendments includes only two paragraphs that discuss the need for and
purpose of DGCL section 102(b)(7), and both paragraphs summarize the hyperbole in the
Sparks Letter and its attached Proposed Amendments Memo regarding insurance unavail-
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tory cites only three Wall Street Journal articles to support the contention
that there was a widespread D&O insurance crisis, such that directors
(and qualified potential directors) were unwilling to serve because corpo-
rations could not afford to insure them. 141 Those articles, when read
closely, do not compel the conclusion that the D&O insurance market
was in crisis or that the only way to address the "crisis" was with liability-
limiting legislation. For example, only one of the articles relied upon in
the Proposed Amendments Memo makes reference to director resigna-
tions after losing D&O insurance coverage. 142 This article notes that five
smaller-sized corporations lost their directors when their D&O insurance
coverage lapsed. Yet five corporations losing directors does not a crisis
make.
Additionally, another Wall Street Journal article mentioned in the leg-
islative history of DGCL section 102(b)(7) focused not on D&O insur-
ance, but rather on: products liability, a skiing resort that raised its prices
"to compensate for a sixfold premium increase," the professional insur-
ance issues involving lawyers, doctors, and engineers, and problems gov-
ernments are experiencing procuring insurance. 143 This article even
noted that the "immediate cause of the sharp premium increases and lack
of coverage are losses that insurers suffered from competitive rate cutting
on commercial property liability policies in the six years through 1984.
The companies had hoped to offset claims payments with income earned
from investing premium dollars. ' 144 Further, "[i]nsurers acknowledge
that many of their financial wounds are self-inflicted, but they claim a
more serious problem is the rising cost of defending and settling lawsuits
and paying big jury awards.' 1 45 So nowhere, then, in sources referenced
in DGCL section 102(b)(7)'s legislative history is there compelling evi-
dence that (1) there was a quantifiable insurance crisis in the D&O insur-
ance arena, (2) the director's duty of care and the Van Gorkom decision
was the reason for any insurance issues, (3) these issues, to the extent that
they existed, could not be addressed with self-insurance or other tools, or
(4) there was a true deficit in the potential director pool, created by this
D&O insurance "crisis," such that any defecting directors could not be
ability and the unwillingness, therefore, of qualified directors to serve. As discussed in the
text, the documented legislative history of DGCL section 102(b)(7) provides scant evi-
dence that DGCL section 102(b)(7) was needed.
141. See Proposed Amendments Memo at 1 (citing Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1986, at D1); Insurers Beginning to Refuse Coverage on Directors, Officers
In Takeover Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 3; Liability Insurance Is Difficult to Find
Now for Directors, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1985, at 1; The Insurance Crisis: Businesses Strug-
gling to Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31.
142. See Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1986, at D1 (noting that
"the Control Data Corporation, the Continental Steel Corporation, the Lear Petroleum
Corporation, South Texas Drilling and Exploration Inc. and Sykes Datatronics have all lost
directors when their insurance ended").






Part of the post-Van Gorkom cries were due to the fact that D&O in-
surance premiums were increasing immediately before and soon after the
case was decided. Even assuming the Van Gorkom case had any relation
to the premium increases, 147 the response to the increased premiums did
not necessarily have to be statutory insulation. Rather, there were at
least two other options: self-insurance and liability caps.
With respect to self-insurance, it is common for corporations to set
aside financial reserves for various liabilities that lurk on the horizon, to
hopefully cover any loss the liability might create in the future. A corpo-
ration could maintain a sizeable "director liability reserve" exclusively to
cover any potential liability exposure of the board. Additionally, self-
insurance has the positive benefit of fostering increased professional care
and attention.148
Liability caps are also useful. For example, the Virginia code limits the
recoverable damages against any one director in any proceeding brought
by or in the right of the corporation or its shareholders to the lesser of the
monetary cap specified in the articles of incorporation or shareholder-
approved by-laws, or the greater of $100,000 or the cash compensation
receive by the director from the corporation over the twelve months prior
to the act complained of.149 The financial exposure of directors is mini-
mal (given that, for most directors, the compensation they receive for
being a director is not their sole source of support), yet shareholders will
still have the ability to police their directors via threat of legal liability.
146. One of the articles referenced in the Proposed Amendments Memo mentions that
the "lack of coverage is making some directors more cautious," and quotes a bank chair-
man who notes that, in response to having to operate without insurance, his board is modi-
fying their level of care: "I'm sure that before [our board] undertook a risky investment or
anything out of the ordinary we would discuss it at great length." Id. This is evidence of a
thoughtful response to Van Gorkom; this does not evince an impending drought of
directors.
147. My research has indicated that the increase in premiums was due more to lagging
pricing previously and the weakening of the economy than to Van Gorkom.
148. Interestingly, this is exactly how anesthesiologists dealt with a malpractice insur-
ance "crisis" a couple of decades ago. To wit, with respect to the medical malpractice insur-
ance "crisis" over the past twenty years, we see that one subset of doctors-
anesthesiologists-successfully precluded a true medical malpractice insurance drought in
their area of expertise by self-regulating and reforming their best practices. Anesthesiolo-
gists were once considered to be among the riskiest doctors to insure. Now, however, their
malpractice insurance premiums are among the smallest, and the premiums today are
smaller than they were, on average and in constant dollars, twenty years ago. This reduc-
tion in premiums and steep decline in the number of patient deaths due to anesthesia
(from one in every 5,000 cases to one per 200,000 to 300,000 cases) is mainly because
anesthesiologists focused on improving patient safety over the past two decades. Rather
than "pushing for laws that would protect them against patient lawsuits," the anesthesiolo-
gists chose to improve their patient safety practices and risk-management procedures, an
option that, admittedly, "many doctors in other specialties did not [choose]." Joseph T.
Hallinan, Heal Thyself- Once Seen as Risky, One Group of Doctors Changes Its Ways,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2005, at Al.
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A) (2004). This statutory provision specifically ex-
cepts from protection "willful misconduct or a knowing violation of the criminal law or of
any federal or state securities law." Id. § 13.1-692.1(B).
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C. DIRECTOR AVAILABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO SERVE
An oft-repeated myth (or bad forecast, at best) is that qualified people
will not want to serve as directors if they are not almost fully insulated
from liability. 150 This argument was bandied about immediately after
Smith v. Van Gorkom, yet there is no empirical evidence that the argu-
ment was ever true. Moreover, as a matter of policy, the argument is
bootless. Other professionals, such as attorneys and doctors, are not spe-
cially insulated from professional liability for their work, yet qualified
lawyers and doctors remain willing to practice. Liability is always a con-
cern for professionals (high net-worth and otherwise), and there are ways
to mitigate liability exposure, as discussed above. In addition, query
whether the investing public should want their investments to be man-
aged by directors who fear being held accountable for gross negligence in
becoming informed.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO
DIRECTOR LIABILITY
If courts, legislators, and academics reconsider director liability and
"not in good faith" with a more faithful interpretation of a director's obli-
gation to act in good faith, directors will obviously be seeking guidance
on minimizing their liability exposure for acts "not in good faith." Below
are a few thoughts.
A. PROFESSIONAL DIRECTORS
The question is occasionally raised as to whether directors are "smart
enough" to detect corporate misconduct and comprehensively do their
jobs. 151 But a look at the Enron board of directors at the time Enron
suffered massive financial devastation makes clear that the Enron board
could not have failed due to lack of firepower. Among the board mem-
bers were Ph.D. economists, former senior managers, a University Presi-
dent, and other people who clearly were smart enough to either
understand financial documents themselves or understand enough to
150. Even if a loss had accrued as a direct and immediate consequence of [the
directors'] error, still, without any other fault on their part, the law, from the
wisest policy, would excuse them. No man, who takes upon himself an office
of trust or confidence for another, or for the public, contracts for anything
more than a diligent attention to its concerns (sometimes differing in degree)
and a faithful and honest discharge of the duty which it imposes. He is not
supposed to have attained infallibility; and does not, therefore, stipulate that
he is free from error. To hold that the law requires this of any man is to
suppose him incapable of erring; and to establish it as a rule that men are to
be responsible for mistake or error of judgment, while acting in good faith,
would put an end to all offices of trust-since no one who is capable or wor-
thy could be found to accept of them.
Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513, 534-535 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
151. See David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 95 (2003)
(citing an on-line poll indicating that 59% of corporate executives believe that their boards
lack the financial acumen to detect cooked books).
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know that they needed to ask for outside counsel. 152 This is typical of the
well-staffed board; either the directors are experts in the field or they are
astute enough to seek the assistance of outside experts that they are spe-
cifically authorized under state statutes to consult. 153
It is hard to believe, then, that massive board failures are usually attrib-
utable to weaknesses in the quality of the directorate. Rather, it is more
likely that directors are over-committed and restricted in their available
time. Typical directors of Fortune 500 companies are usually either cur-
rent officers of large businesses or former officers who are currently hold-
152. At the time Enron declared bankruptcy in 2001, the Enron board of directors
included:
Robert Belfer, who had been an Enron director since 1983, was the Chairman and CEO of
Belco Oil & Gas Corp., and was the former President and Chairman of Belco Petroleum
Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Enron; Norman P. Blake, Jr., who had been a director
since 1993, was the Chairman, President and CEO of Comdisco, Inc., and was a director of
Owens-Corning Corporation; Ronnie Chan, who had been a director since 1996, was the
Chairman of Hang Lung Group, and was a director of both Standard Chartered PLC and
Motorola, Inc.; John H. Duncan, who had been an Enron director since 1985, and was a
director of both EOTT Energy Corporation and Group I Automotive; Wendy L. Gramm,
who had been a director since 1993, was the Director of the Regulatory Studies Program of
the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, had been the Chairman of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission in Washington, D.C. from February 1988 to January
1993, and was a director of IBP, State Farm Insurance Company, and Invesco Funds; Rob-
ert J. Jaedicke, who had been a director since 1985, was a Professor Emeritus of Account-
ing at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business, and was a director of both
California Water Service Company and Boise Cascade Corporation; Kenneth L. Lay who
had been a director since 1985, had been both the Chairman of Enron since 1986 and
Enron CEO from 1986 to February 2001, and was director of both Eli Lilly and Company
and Compaq Computer Corporation; Charles A. LeMaistre, who had been a director since
1985, and was the former President of the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center in Houston; John Mendelsohn, who had been a director since 1999, was the Presi-
dent of the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, and was a
director of ImClone Systems, Inc.; Paulo V. Ferraz Pereira, who had been a director since
1999, was the Executive V.P. of Group Bozano, and was both the former President and
CEO of the State Bank of Rio de Janeiro; Frank Savage, who had been a director since
1999, was the Chairman of Alliance Capital Management International, and was a director
of Lockheed Martin Corporation, Alliance Capital Management L.P. and Qualcomm Cor-
poration; Jeffrey Skilling, who had been a director since 1997, was the President and CEO
of Enron since February 2001 and the President and COO of Enron from January 1997 to
February 2001, and was the Chairman and CEO of Enron North American Corporation
and its predecessor companies from August 1990 until December 1997; John Wakeham,
who had been a director since 1994, was a former U.K. Secretary of State for Energy and
Leader of the Houses of Commons and Lords, was a member of British Parliament from
1974 to 1992, and was the Chairman of the Press Complaints Commission in the U.K;
Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., who had been a director since 1985, was the Chairman and CEO
of Capricorn Holdings, Inc., was a former Senior Executive V.P. and director of Penn
Central Corporation, and was a director of NATCO Group, Inc., Mrs. Fields' Holding
Company, Inc., CCC Information Services Group, and DynCorp.
See Enron Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A), at 4-7 (Mar. 27, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/000095012901001669/0000950129-01-0016
69-index.htm; see also S. REP. No. 107-70, at 28, 34-36, 47, 55 (2002), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi70802rpt.pdf (describing the various roles the
individual directors had in the downfall of Enron).
153. See DGCL § 141(e) (authorizing corporate directors to rely on officers and outside
experts such as accountants and lawyers in fulfilling their duties as directors).
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ing other board or consulting positions.154 They simply do not have time
to thoughtfully monitor each of their charges.
This raises an interesting point for further consideration: Perhaps it is
sensible to have on large boards a number of "professional directors."'1 55
The professional director is one who serves on multiple boards of direc-
tors and does not have another job in addition to being a director.' 56 The
154. See Aims, supra note 19, at 239-40 (reporting on multiple board memberships
among directors of the 100 largest U.S. companies).
155. See Joe Queenan, The Feat of the Master, CHIEF EXECUTIVE Jan. 1, 2004, at 62,
available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PringArticle.aspx?id=114050454.
156. Id. I contrast the "professional director" from the "trophy director." The latter is
invited to sit on a board of directors due in large part to his level of public visibility. I view
former Disney director Sidney Poitier and former Enron director John Mendelsohn as tro-
phy directors. They both had serious time commitments while acting as directors: They
both had "day jobs." John Mendelsohn was the President of the University of Texas M.D.
Anderson Cancer Center in Houston while also serving as a director for Enron (and as a
director of ImClone Systems, Inc.), and Poitier was a Disney Director from 1994 until 2003
while also serving as the Chief Executive Officer of Verdon-Cedric Productions. See En-
ron Proxy, supra note 152, at 6. There is no compelling reason why either director was
more skilled to be a director than other people of similar backgrounds who do not have
"day jobs," other than the public visibility issue, which makes Poitier and Mendelsohn, in
my view, trophy directors.
A professional director, contrariwise, is a person who has no job in addition to being a
director. Perhaps he or she is on multiple boards of directors. I view this "professional
director" as akin to a hired gun-a person who is asked to be on a board of directors
because he is good at being a director-this is what he does for a living.
There is no agreed-upon dictionary definition of "professional director." Academics
generally agree, however, on some of the defining characteristics of a professional director:
A professional director has no other demanding full-time job, and he therefore has the
time to commit to monitoring vigorously the corporation for which he is a director. Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Insti-
tutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 885-86 (1991). The professional director has
perhaps a full-time commitment to the corporation, see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century,
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 121-22 (2002); Gilson & Kraakman, supra, at 885, perhaps a staff
of advisors or employees, Wells, supra, at 123; and a salary close to commensurate with his
expertise and sufficient to justify his time commitment to the corporation, see Gilson &
Kraakman, supra, at 885.
As to the full-time commitment to the corporation, I have found no scholar willing to say
that a professional director should (a) have no other outside employment and (b) sit on
only one board of directors. However, there is a difference to me between, for example, a
current University President or current Law School Dean sitting on a board of directors
and a retired University President sitting on a board of directors. Dean Mark Sargent,
current dean of Villanova Law School, sits on the Board of Trustees of Wilmington Trust
Mutual Funds. Curriculum Vitae: Dean Mark A. Sargent, http://www.law.villanova.edu/
academics/faculty/biographies/deans/sargent/curriculumvitae.pdf. Richard L. Morrill, for-
mer President of the University of Richmond, sits on the Board of Directors of both Al-
bemarle and Tredegar Corporations. Albemarle Corp., Proxy Statement, at 7 (Mar. 2,
2007), available at http://www.albemarle.com/Investor information/financialinformation/
annual-reports/2007/AR2006_Proxy.pdf; Tredegar Corp., Proxy Statement, at 11 (Mar. 28,
2007), available at http://www.tredegar.com1PDF/07proxy.PDF. I have no issue with the
latter as a matter of good corporate governance. Morrill, having previously juggled the
time demands of being a university president, can surely juggle the time demands of sitting
on two boards. The former, however, gives me pause: Dean Sargent is uniquely qualified
to be a good director. He is an expert in financial and legal matters, he is a guru in the
world of ethics (particularly business ethics), and he is clearly smart, diligent, and responsi-
ble. Does he have the time, however, to be an attentive monitoring director? If a matter of
great import and serious time pressure arises with respect to the Wilmington Trust Mutual
Funds, can Dean Sargent immediately clear his schedule enough to allow him to attend
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professional director is, to me, much preferable to, for example, the Uni-
versity President who, in his "spare time," sits on a board of directors. It
is inconceivable that a person who has a full-time, demanding "day job"
can do an acceptable job as a director of a publicly traded corporation. It
seems more sensible to have as directors otherwise qualified professionals
(former accountants, businesspeople, lawyers) who have no job other
than serving on multiple boards of directors. 157 These directors would (a)
not have a divided primary loyalty with a demanding day job, and (b) be
in a unique position to exploit economies of scale. As to the latter point,
if a professional director is on five boards of directors, he can compare
how the boards review financial statements, how the boards deliberate,
how often the boards meet, how much access to auditors and lawyers the
boards are provided, and so on.158 That professional director can cross-
pollinate the best, most effective practices among the boards on which he
serves. Nothing but good can come of that.
B. BEST PRACTICES
If directors are still worried about personal liability after Van Gorkom
and if directors are still worried about missing an Enron-esque nightmare
brewing, "best practices" can be distilled from recent events and case law
to protect against needless exposure. To protect against the argument
that a director was not acting "in good faith," a director should:
(a) Attend board of directors' meetings regularly and stay awake. 159
marathon board meetings? What will he say to the major Villanova alumni donors who are
planning to have dinner with him that week? What will he say to the top-twenty Law
Review Board at whose symposium he is set to speak that week? And, assuming he can
clear his schedule for a few critical days, can he so do if the initial crisis re-erupts in a few
weeks? I do not know the answer to these questions, and I, therefore, take pause with the
notion that someone in a busy, high-profile law school dean position is the best potential
director.
157. For example, my old accountant, from Albany, New York, Aanen Nelsen, Jr., al-
ways comes to mind when I think of the potential professional director. Aanen has been
an accountant for about thirty-five years. He majored in accounting at Siena College, he
has his own accounting firm, and he handles accounting for various individuals, families,
and businesses.
I suspect that Aanen makes about $120,000 per year, so he likely would be willing to give
up his practice and take two director seats, each paying $85,000 per year. In return, each
board on which he sat would be garnering a director who (a) has extensive financial acu-
men, (b) is very familiar with accounting practices and financial materials, and (c) has
roughly twenty to thirty hours per week (per corporation) to devote to director-related
work.
The argument that I have encountered against this sort of professional director is that
experience in certain industries is critical to being a good director. Better to have a retired
entertainment industry CEO who is currently still consulting for his former firm and who
sits on three other Fortune 500 boards serve as director than someone with Aanen's gen-
eral financial and business expertise and time availability. I disagree, and I anticipate a
move toward an increase in the number of professional directors over the next decade.
158. See Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989, 1015 (2003) (discussing
high-profile directors who serve on multiple boards of directors).
159. Shawn Young, Almar Latour & Susan Pulliam, Ebbers Lawyer Paints Sullivan as
Chronic Liar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at Cl (Scott Sullivan, former CFO of WorldCom,
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Although directors are allowed in most jurisdictions to telephonically
be present at meetings of the board of directors, and although directors
are generally not sanctioned for missing meetings, it is prudent for a di-
rector to attend, in person, all meetings of the board of directors. This
allows the director to at least keep apprised of corporate events and is-
sues that are significant enough to make it onto the meeting agenda. As
well, the face-to-face interaction fosters more discourse among the
outside directors, which is useful in instances where the outside directors
are at odds with the insiders. If a director has to miss a board meeting,
the director should follow-up to ensure that he is briefed about the sub-
stance of the meeting and the issues that arose. 160
(b) Ask questions.
No published court opinion exists wherein a court penalizes a director
for his ignorance in an instance where the director clearly made a consid-
ered attempt, proportionate to the import of the matters at stake, to edify
himself and ask key questions.
(c) Become familiar with financial documents and be aware of com-
mon red flags.
Hardly a day goes by without an announcement of a major corpora-
tion's earnings restatement. While directors do not have to be financial
wizards or accounting mavens, they increase their liability exposure if
they do not endeavor to understand their corporation's financial state-
ments.161 Asking for a two-hour financial statement familiarization semi-
nar run by an accounting firm and reading up a bit on financial statement
interpretation are easy steps for a director to take in a good-faith effort to
be informed.162
(d) Keep tabs on operational problems.
If directors know something significant is going wrong or appears to be
raising concerns at an operational level, but the directors fail to keep tabs
on or follow-up regarding the matter, the directors are opening the door
to potential liability. 163 Directors should be briefed regularly (in writing,
testified that he "misled the board" with relative ease, given that "a lot of people weren't
even awake, so there wasn't a lot of challenge").
160. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 819-20, 822 (N.J. 1981) (discuss-
ing the liability of a director who was inattentive, an alcoholic, and depressed: "Directors
are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corpora-
tion."); see also Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 895-97 (10th Cir. 1986) (imposing liability on
a chairman who failed to monitor investment decisions, failed to respond to the company's
increasing exposure to risk, and did not regularly attend board meetings).
161. See, e.g., Francis, 432 A.2d at 822 ("Directors are under a continuing obligation to
keep informed about the activities of the corporation."); see also In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
162. For example, in the Wall Street Journal, various easy-to-read accounting fraud arti-
cles regularly appear and help non-accountants understand signs of "cooked books." See
Ian McDonald, Ahead of the Tape, Today's Market Forecast, Lies, Damned Lies, and Earn-
ings, WALL ST. J. Nov. 26, 2004, at Cl (discussing the red flag of the "widening chasm
between companies' earnings reported according to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples ... and their fuzzier 'operating' figures").
163. See In re Abbott Labs S'holder Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Plaintiffs
... accused the directors not only of gross negligence, but of intentional conduct in failing
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if meetings are logistically difficult) by senior management about material
operational issues, and directors should be proactive in asking about po-
tential problems looming on the horizon. 164 Making the "wrong" deci-
sion about how to respond to a significant operational problem is not a
liability-exposing act,'165 but fully ignoring the problem after it has been
raised is. 166
(e) Manage management.
Hiring, compensating, evaluating, and retaining or terminating senior
management all require the attention of the board. 167 Issues regularly
arise regarding: (a) a board's readiness to replace senior executives,
should such become necessary;168 (b) the compensation, both in size and
to address the federal violation problems, alleging 'a conscious disregard of known risks,
which conduct, if proven, cannot have been undertaken in good faith."') (quoting McCall
v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001)).
164. Note that directors are not obligated to find out about any and all operational
missteps, and "absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior
officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees
and the honesty of their dealings on the company's behalf." In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). Directors have the obligation only to
assure "themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that
are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope,
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and
its business performance." Id. at 970. "Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for
such an information system is a question of business judgment," but, as a practical matter,
liability for inattention and inaction could really only arise from "an unconsidered failure
of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented
the loss." Id. at 967 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); accord Abbott Labs, 325
F.3d at 806 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (This "case is not about the failure
of the directors to establish and carry out ideal corporate governance practices. The facts
in Abbott [Labs] do not support the conclusion that the directors were 'blamelessly una-
ware of the conduct leading to the corporate liability."') (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d
at 969).
An interesting related current issue concerns "technology" board committees. See, e.g.,
Bhattiprolu Murti, Technology Committees Catch On in Boardrooms, WALL ST. J., June 30,
2005, at B3. In response to increasingly complex technology issues, the technology disclo-
sure requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, technology-related security and privacy is-
sues such as those arising when a retailer's or bank's client database is compromised, and
the increasing importance of technology in the infrastructure of a business, many boards
are establishing "technology committees." Id. While the failure to have such a committee
is not a lapse in a board's business judgment as an absolute matter, boards would be well-
served to examine whether the nature, intricacies, or infrastructure of their business justi-
fies forming a technology subcommittee of the board or directors.
165. Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589, 598-599 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
166. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (liability may be imposed on board when an
"unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would,
arguably, have prevented the loss") (emphasis in original); accord McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d
at 999 (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967).
167. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). Remember
that senior management only has their authority as a result of directors delegating their
management authority under statutes such as DGCL section 141.
168. See J. Lynn Lunsford & Joann S. Lublin, Boeing's Pushed Into Search for CEO,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at A6 (discussing how Boeing's board "is now facing questions
about how prepared it was to find a permanent CEO," particularly in light of the fact that
the departing CEO, Harry Stonecipher, was brought out of retirement in December 2003
because the board did not then have any other qualified CEO candidates lined up); see also
Ram Charan, Who Will Be Your Next CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2005, at B2 (observing
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method, of senior management; 169 (c) management benefits;170 and (d)
the termination of senior management. 171 The outside directors on a
board should regularly meet in the absence of the inside directors to as-
sess the performance of their senior management and address any hiring,
firing, or executive compensation issues. 172
that many boards "have no meaningful CEO succession plan," and making suggestions on
how to fix this internal weakness); Barbara Martinez & Joann Lublin, Change of Formula:
Merck Replaces Embattled CEO With Insider Richard Clark: As Gilmartin Accelerates Re-
turiement, Drug Giant Plans Review of Strategy; Unusual Role for a Board Trio, WALL ST.
J., May 6, 2005, at Al (discussing how after a wave of litigation over Vioxx, one of Merck's
biggest money-makers that was pulled from shelves due to cardiovascular issues, and strug-
gles to keep Merck's pipeline moving, long-time Chairman and Chief Executive Raymond
Gilmartin was removed from his position ten months prior to his scheduled retirement and
replaced by Richard Clark). Moreover, directors should have an informed process for
screening and selecting a CEO. Carol Hymowitz, The Perils of Picking CEOs: Add Candi-
date's Character to Boards' List of Concerns as Openings at the Top Grow, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2005, at B2 ("Micheal Leven, CEO of U.S. Franchise Systems, . . . predicts that
CEO candidates 'may soon have to undergo the kind of FBI clearances given to prospec-
tive cabinet members. And,' he adds, 'that may be appropriate given the money they earn
and the responsibilities they're given."').
169. Joann S. Lublin, Imprisonment Doesn't Bar Pay for Select Group of CEOs, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 2, 2005, at B1 (discussing salary and benefits either paid to or accrued for
Martha Stewart (founder and senior executive of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc.),
Andrew Wiederhorm (founder and former CEO of Fog Cutter Capital Group Inc.), and
Steve Madden (founder and former senior executive of Steven Madden Ltd.) while they
were incarcerated or upon their release).
170. See, e.g., Kathryn Kranhold, GE Changes Policy on the Use of Its Jets by Vice
Chairmen, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2005, at B2 (GE's board changed its policy regarding the
personal use of corporate aircrafts by vice chairmen to require payment for personal use;
previously, GE's former Vice Chairman Dennis Dammerman cost GE close to a million
dollars over two years for his personal use of GE corporate aircrafts).
171. See, e.g., Rick Brooks, Krispy Kreme Ousts Six Executives, WALL ST. J., June 22,
2005, at B3 (six senior executives at Krispy Kreme resigned or retired after a special com-
mittee comprised of two independent Krispy Kreme directors investigated concerns about
the company's franchise repurchases, concerns raised by auditors, and other operational
and financial issues); Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks, Once-Hot Krispy Kreme Ousts Its
CEO Amid Accounting Woes, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 19, 2005, at Al (Krispy Kreme CEO Scott
Livengood "was pushed out by directors amid slumping sales, accounting woes and a fed-
eral probe").
After Richard Scrushy, former Chief Executive and founder of HealthSouth Corp., was
acquitted of accounting fraud, conspiracy, and related charges, he sought to reclaim his
executive position with the company (he had been terminated in 2003 when the extensive
multibillion-dollar fraud that took place while he was in leadership was revealed). The
board adamantly maintained that they would not hire Scrushy back in any capacity. Dan
Morse, Scrushy Wants HealthSouth Job Back, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2005, at A3.
The board's position is clearly the correct position to take from a liability exposure
standpoint-Scrushy, who maintains that all five of HealthSouth's former finance chiefs
hid their fraudulent acts from him, has shown himself to be, at the least, an inattentive
senior executive and, at the worst, a fraudster. Contrast the HealthSouth board's decisive
action in terminating and refusing to re-hire Scrushy with the Disney board's failure to
terminate Michael Eisner after his egregious behavior in hiring and negotiating an obscene
termination package with his friend Michael Ovitz came to light. See infra note 172.
172. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. recently opined that "[t]he imperial
CEO is no more." Arthur Levitt, The Imperial CEO Is No More, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2005, at A16 (discussing recent board and shareholder activism in monitoring senior execu-
tive performance). Chairman Levitt pointed to a spate of CEO firings by boards and pres-
sure put on management by investors to substantiate the point that "we are experiencing a
cultural change in corporate America," and "[glone are the days of the autocratic, muscu-
lar CEO whose picture appeared on the covers of business magazines." Id.; see Alan Mur-
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(f) Use extra care with mergers, acquisitions, recalls, expansion, and
other big-ticket items.
The lesson to be learned from Smith v. Van Gorkom, as discussed
above, is that courts will look closely at the evaluative process employed
by directors when acting on issues of significant import, such as sales or
acquisitions. Courts will expect directors who are acting in good faith to
gather an appropriate amount of relevant information and deliberate for
a proportionate amount of time when making major decisions.173
(g) Ask for help when needed.
ray, Emboldened Boards Tackle Imperial CEOs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at A2 ("There
seems to be a sea change going on here-a kind of maturation of American corporate
governance. The king now has a parliament .... Americans still want their CEOs to don
wings and fly. But someone needs to make sure they don't get too close to the sun.").
For example, Carl Vogel, former chief executive of Charter Communications Inc., re-
signed under pressure amid board dissatisfaction, in part due to Charter's failure to per-
form at a level that met the board's expectations. Peter Grant, Charter Communications
CEO Quits Amid Board Unhappiness; May Takes Over From Vogel as Cable Giant's Direc-
tors Cite a Slack Performance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2005, at B3 (stating that Lance Conn, a
Charter director, told analysts and investors on a conference call that Charter "has not met
your expectations or ours"). Similarly, the board of Hewlett-Packard Company ousted
superstar CEO Carly Fiorina after five-and-one-half years of disappointing performance
and Fiorina's resistance to the board's plan for her to delegate some day-to-day authority
to heads of Hewlett-Packard's key business units. Pui-Wing Tam, H-P's Board Ousts Fi-
orina as CEO; How Traits that Helped Executive Climb Ladder Came to be Fatal Flaws,
You Learn to Be Self-Reliant, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at Al.
Some directors appear to be Willing to arguably go overboard with managing manage-
ment. The board of directors of Boeing forced Boeing's president and chief executive,
Harry Stonecipher, to resign after the board learned about Mr. Stonecipher's extra-marital
affair with a female Boeing executive. The board determined that Mr. Stonecipher used
poor judgment and placed Boeing in a potentially damaging situation. See Emergency
Exit: Boeing's CEO Forced to Resign Over His Affair With Employee, Stonecipher was
Brought in to Restore Credibility in Wake of Other Scandals; Undone by Secret Tipster,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2005, at Al. In my opinion, the board took a conservative option in
forcing Mr. Stonecipher's resignation, as I doubt the failure to do so would have come
close to breaching the board's duty of care. Their aggressive reaction is laudable,
nonetheless.
The antithesis of Boeing's board's derisive response is the Disney board's apathetic re-
sponse when the audacious nature of Michael Eisner's flagrant missteps in the hiring and
firing of Michael Ovitz came to light. See supra note 171. Specifically, it is beyond me as
to why the Disney board did not fire Michael Eisner as soon as the board realized that
Eisner hired Ovitz, who had little relevant experience or qualifications that would justify
his senior executive position at Disney, basically because Ovitz was a long-time friend;
Eisner negotiated with Ovitz a package for Ovitz that was, by most standards, wantonly
excessive; and Eisner negotiated with Ovitz a termination package that was even more
excessive than Ovitz's employment package. Ovitz's employment and later termination
packages made leaving Disney more lucrative to Ovitz than staying and fulfilling his con-
tract. Eisner was not protecting Disney's interests and the interests of the Disney share-
holders, and it astounds me that the board let Eisner remain in office when these egregious
actions came to light. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
36-46 (Del. 2006).
173. For example, when Cnooc Limited made a bid for Unocal Corporation, outside
Cnooc director Kenneth Courtis "peppered" the independent advisors about the potential
offer, notwithstanding the fact that Courtis had a background as an economist, was work-
ing for investment bank Goldman Sachs, and had experience with mergers and acquisi-
tions. See China Inc. Looks Set to Outdo Old Japan Inc.: Cnooc Outside Director Courtis
Stalled Earlier Bid for Unocal Despite Goldman Funding Pledge, WALL ST. J., June 24,
2005, at C1. Although some viewed Courtis's requests for more information as "bor-
der[ing] on unreasonable," id., given that Cnooc would have to borrow $16 billion to fi-
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Directors are not expected to be operational mavens, financial experts,
forensic accounting gurus, and legal nimrods. Directors should consult
outside experts as appropriate. 174 That said, directors should ideally re-
tain disinterested outside experts. For example, directors should employ
their own separate investment bankers to provide a fairness opinion in
the case of an acquisition as opposed to using the investment bank that is
advising the corporation itself.' 75
(h) Be aware of investor grumblings.
As discussed in Part I, supra, directors act as fiduciaries with respect to
the corporation, which is owned by shareholders. It is prudent, therefore,
for directors to keep a thumb on the pulse of investor sentiment, 176 both
as a matter of law and as a matter of good corporate governance. 177
nance its acquisition of Unocal, Courtis's requests for more information were exactly what
would justify giving Courtis the protection of the business judgment rule.
174. DGCL section 141(e) authorizes such:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee desig-
nated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of such member's
duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the
corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements
presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's officers or employ-
ees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to
matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person's pro-
fessional or expert competence and who has been selected with reasonable
care by or on behalf of the corporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2007).
175. See Ann Davis & Monica Langley, Open Secrets-Good Reviews: Opinions Label-
ing Deals 'Fair' Can Be Far From Independent Banks that Do Them Often Are Advisers on
Transactions and Have Fees at Stake; A High-Profit Margin Item, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
2004, at Al (discussing transactions related to the sale of Crown American Realty Trust,
wherein the directors, suspicious of a fairness opinion initially provided to them, demanded
a new investment banking team that had not done prior conflicted work, giving them the
mandate that "[y]ou report directly to the board, not the CEO.").
176. Both the Disney litigation and the recent shakeup of Morgan Stanley were pre-
ceded by loud shareholder complaints. Ann Davis, Purcell's Close Ties to Board Compli-
cate Dissident's Mission, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at C1. Directors are not obligated to
defer to shareholder pressure, but, at some point, it makes sense to at least listen to share-
holder complaints to ensure the directors are informed.
177. The Disney's directors were recently sued again by former directors Roy Disney
and Stanley Gold for allegedly conducting an inadequate and biased search for Michael
Eisner's replacement. Merissa Mart, Suit is Filed Over Disney CEO Search; Ex-Directors
Claim Board Misled Investors on Range of Potential Candidates, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2005,
at B4. Specifically, Messrs. Disney and Gold believe that Mr. Eisner's involvement in the
search for his successor was inappropriate and external candidates for the position were
being warded off. Id. (stating that Meg Whitman, eBay Inc.'s CEO, withdrew from Dis-
ney's CEO search because she allegedly believed the Disney board was moving slowly and
seemingly set on Mr. Iger.). Given that the year prior, Disney and Gold led a shareholder
revolt against Michael Eisner that led to his relinquishing his chairmanship and announcing
his decision to resign within the next couple of years, the Disney board would have been
wise to consult Messrs. Disney and Gold to solicit input on the CEO search.
In contrast to the Disney directors' inattention to investor concerns, after American In-
ternational Group, Inc. was shaken by state and federal accounting inquiries and longtime
former chairman and CEO Maurice "Hank" Greenberg was forced to resign, Interim
Chairman Frank Zarb reached out to large institutional investors to solicit input on new
independent director nominees. Joann Lublin, Monica Langley & Theo Francis, Moving
the Market: AIG Talks to Big Holders About Board's Composition, WALL ST. J., June 20,
2005, at C3. While Zarb did not say directly that he was attempting to appease large share-
holders, his outreach came on the heels of a perceived corporate governance failure that
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(i) Know what the job of director entails.
It is difficult for a director to perform his job well if he is unclear re-
garding his responsibilities. For example, in the prosecution of Mark
Swartz and L. Dennis Kozlowski, Tyco International Ltd.'s former chief
executives who looted the company, questions were raised as to whether
the Tyco directors approved the multi-million dollar loans that Swartz
and Kozlowski forgave themselves. 178 Had the Tyco directors been clear
that they were responsible for approving these sorts of loans and the for-
giveness thereof, they could have questioned the reductions of Swartz's
and Kozlowski's loans. 179
VI. CONCLUSION
Does the difference between the phrases "not in good faith" and "bad
faith" matter? Absolutely. Director liability jurisprudence actually
hinges on this difference. The continued bastardizing of the meaning of
the failure to act in good faith is a wordsmith failure that is contrary to
decades worth of fiduciary common law. If directors are to be insulated
from all but bad faith actions, the language of statutes such as DGCL
section 102(b)(7) should be changed to achieve that result. 180 Manipulat-
ing the fairly uncomplicated phrase "not in good faith" is not acceptable.
led to AIG's accounting problems (in part due to the "sometimes-uncompromising" man-
agement style of Greenberg). Id. Zarb seemingly attempted to solidify the confidence of
AIG's large institutional investors in AIG's evolving management team. While certainly
not legally necessary, the outreach was a sensible strategic move. Directors cannot dele-
gate their management duties to shareholders, but sometimes it makes strategic sense to
consult with powerful, vocal shareholders, to avoid the time waste and expense of later
shareholder litigation.
As well, under Rule 14(a)(8), shareholders have some access to a corporation's proxy
mechanism as well, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2005). When a shareholder submits to corpo-
rate officials a shareholder proposal for inclusion on the corporation's proxy statement, the
corporation can look to Rule 14(a)(8) for guidance as to whether the proposal can be
excluded from the proxy statement. If the procedural prerequisites to inclusion on the
proxy statement are satisfied (amount of stock holding, length of stock holding, etc.), but
the corporation does not want to include the shareholder's proposal on their proxy state-
ment, the corporation can request no-action relief from the SEC's Office of Mergers and
Acquisitions to support the corporation's decision not to include the proposal. The SEC
has not been particularly generous to shareholders of late, but the attempt of a shareholder
to submit a proposal costs the company time and effort regardless of the outcome of the
SEC's review. See Bruce Orwall & Deborah Solomon, SEC Says Disney Can Exclude
Shareholder Resolution After All, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2004, at C4.
178. See, e.g., Chad Bray, Executives on Trial: Swartz Believed Panel at Tyco Cleared
Deal; Former Executive Testifies Ex-CEO Said Late Director Agreed to Loan Forgiveness,
WALL ST. J., May 6, 2005, at C2; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d
at 288-89 ("Although formal board approval appeared necessary," the plaintiffs alleged
that no board member asked for a meeting to discuss Ovitz's non-fault termination.).
179. See Tyco Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 41 (Dec. 30, 2002), available at
http://investors.tyco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112348&p=irol-SECText&TEXT=aHRc Dov
L2NjYm4uMTBrd2l6YXJkLmNvbS94bWwvZmlsaW5nLnhtbD9yZXBvPXRlbmsmaXB
hZ2U9MTklOTUwOCZkb2M9MSZudWO9Mw (providing Tyco's financial statements,
showing that loans to officers for 2002 were $5 billion more than in 2001).
180. It is very unlikely that legislators could have gotten away with adopting a standard
prohibiting directors only from "affirmatively acting in bad faith." I imagine their constitu-
ents would have objected mightily, were the flimsy language brought to their attention.
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The failure to take note of and halt the mutilation of the phrase "not in
good faith" will actually change the obligation of a director from the obli-
gation "to be loyal to the trust imposed in him, and to execute it with the
single purpose of advancing his principal's interests,"'181 to the mere obli-
gation to refrain from doing things that evince "some sort of obvious,
deliberate, or egregious failure. ' 182 This shift in obligation would effectu-
ate a significant substantive departure from long-established fiduciary
common law governing directors. The modern director would arguably
be reduced in academic theory and common law to useless folderol. A
more accurate, exacting definition of the phrase "not in good faith" is
needed to ensure directors are held accountable for meeting their good
faith obligation. Anything less is unacceptable.
181. ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 90, 110 (2d ed. 1901) (emphasis
added).
182. Sale, supra note 55, at 493.
2007]
492 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
